AVIAN FLU

[Guest]

H5N1 OUTBREAK IN TURKEYS ON A FARM IN SUFFOLK, ENGLAND.

 

DEFRA

 

Declaration of a Protection Zone, Surveillance Zone and Restricted Zone (Avian

Influenza) and Revocation of the Declaration of a Protection Zone and Surveillance

Zone (Avian Influenza) made at 14.00 p.m. on 3 February 2007

 

The Chief Veterinary Officer has confirmed that highly pathogenic avian influenza is

present in England. The Secretary of State has taken into account the criteria set out in

article 29(5) of the Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals

(England) (no. 2) Order 2006 (“The Order”).

The Secretary of State declares the area described in Annex 1 to this Declaration to be a

Protection Zone in which the measures set out in Schedule 4 to the Order apply.

The Secretary of State declares the area described in Annex 2 to this Declaration to be a

Surveillance Zone in which the measures set out in Schedule 5 to the Order apply. The

additional measures set out in Annex 3 also apply in the Surveillance Zone.

The Secretary of State declares the area described in Annex 4 to be a Restricted Zone in

which the measures set out in Annex 5 apply.

The Declaration of a Protection Zone and Surveillance Zone made at 14.00 p.m. on 3

February 2007 is withdrawn.

These measures apply from 19.15 p.m. on 3 February 2007 until this Declaration is

withdrawn or amended by further declaration.

This Declaration is made under article 28 of the Order.

Signed

Andrew Clayton

19.15 p.m. 3 February 2007.

Authorised by the Secretary of State.

 

Failure to comply with this Declaration may be an offence under section 72 or 73 of the

Animal Health Act 1981.

Schedules to the Order and a copy of a map showing the Protection and Surveillance

Zones are attached for ease of reference. Copies of this Declaration and of the Order and

of a map showing the zones described in this Declaration are available at

www.defra.gov.uk and from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,

1A Page Street, London SW1P 4PQ.

 

Annex 1

Protection Zone

The Protection Zone comprises that part of the county of Suffolk contained within a

circle of radius 3 kilometres, centred on grid reference TM4009079918. The grid

reference is a British National Grid reference.

 

Annex 2

Surveillance Zone

The Surveillance Zone comprises that part of the county of Suffolk contained within a

circle of radius 10 kilometres, centred on grid reference TM4009079918. The grid

reference is a British National Grid reference.

 

Annex 3

Additional Measures in the Surveillance Zone

Isolation of poultry and other captive birds

The occupier of premises in the zone where poultry or other captive birds are kept must

ensure that they are-

(a) housed; or

( kept isolated (if housing is impractical or would adversely affect the birds’

welfare to a significant degree).

 

Measures where birds are isolated

If birds are kept isolated but not housed, the occupier must –

(a) ensure that they have no contact with poultry or other captive birds on other

premises; and

( take all reasonable steps to minimise their contact with wild birds, including

providing them with food and water to which wild birds have no access.

 

Annex 4

Restricted Zone

The Restricted Zone comprises those parts of the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk

contained within the following boundaries:

From map reference TM357400, follow minor road west to a T junction at map reference

TM346400. Turn right onto the B1083 and continue north along the B1083 to the

roundabout at map reference TM292500. Turn left onto the A1152 and continue west

and then south to the roundabout at map reference TM259493.

Turn right onto the B1079 and continue west and then north west to the junction at map

reference TM214538. Turn left onto the B1078 and continue west to the junction with

the A140(T) at map reference TM111548.

Turn right and continue north along the A140(T) until the junction with the A47(T) at

TG219038. Turn right and continue north east and then east along the A47(T) to the

roundabout at map reference TG518084.

Turn onto the A149 and continue south west to a junction at TG521080. Follow the

B1141 south east to a junction with a minor road at map reference TG525078. Turn left

into the minor road and continue east to a T junction with another minor road at the coast

at map reference TG531079 (boundary extends directly east to coast at TG532078 and

follows coast south to map reference TM357400).

 

 

Annex 5

Measures in the Restricted Zone

The measures set out in articles 9 to 15 of the Avian Influenza (H5N1 in Poultry)

(England) Order 2006; and

 

Isolation of poultry and other captive birds

The occupier of premises in the zone where poultry or other captive birds are kept must

ensure that they are-

© housed; or

(d) kept isolated (if housing is impractical or would adversely affect the birds’

welfare to a significant degree).

 

Measures where birds are isolated

If birds are kept isolated but not housed, the occupier must –

© ensure that they have no contact with poultry or other captive birds on other

premises; and

(d) take all reasonable steps to minimise their contact with wild birds, including

providing them with food and water to which wild birds have no access.

 

A map showing the new zones is shown at:

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/disease/ai/pdf/zones030207.pdf

 

 

DEFRA NEWS RELEASE  

    

Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR

Out of hours telephone 020 7270 8960 Ref: 35/07

Date: 3 February 2007

  

  

H5N1 in poultry in Suffolk confirmed as Asian strain of avian influenza

  

This afternoon the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) confirmed that the H5N1 avian influenza identified in sampled from in poultry found dead on a farm near Lowestoft in Suffolk is the highly pathogenic Asian strain. It is similar to the virus that was found in Hungary in January.

As further information becomes available and in consultation with ornithological experts further restrictions may be required.

 

Keepers of birds are urged to be vigilant and to exercise good biosecurity. Any owners that suspect disease should act quickly and consult their vet. Avian influenza is a notifiable disease and must be reported to the local Divisional Veterinary Manager in the State Veterinary Service (see below).

 

There is no reason for public health concern. Avian Influenza is a disease of birds and whilst it can pass very rarely and with difficulty, to humans this requires extremely close contact with infected birds, particularly faeces. Defra, the Health Protection Agency and local NHS are continuing to work closely to ensure that all necessary precautions are being taken. Despite this incident, the current level of risk to humans from H5N1 remains extremely low.

 

Similar to events at Cellardyke, Fife, Scotland, last year, an additional restricted zone has been brought in, see map. Basically means if you are inside any of these three zones you keep the birds confined to their loft.

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/disease/ai/pdf/zones030207.pdf

 

 

 

 

DEFRA NEWS RELEASE  

    

Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR

Out of hours telephone 020 7270 8960 Ref: 36/07

Date: 3 February 2007

  

  

Additional restrictions imposed following confirmation of Highly Pathogenic H5N1

  

Following confirmation of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza Defra has announced that further restrictions will be put in place around the infected premises.

In consultation with ornithologists a wider Restricted Zone has been imposed. This is in addition to the 3km Protection Zone and 10km Surveillance Zone introduced earlier today. The Restricted Zone covers east Suffolk and South East Norfolk bounded to the west and the north by the A140 and A47 respectively, and is approximately 2090sqkm. It requires the isolation of poultry from wild birds and movements to be licensed.

 

As further information becomes available and in consultation with ornithological experts the restrictions in place may be adjusted.

 

 

[Guest]

Ben Bradshaw made a Statement to the House of Commons today on the current AI outbreak in England. Full text at:

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/ministers/statements/dm070205.htm

[Guest]

DEFRA NEWS RELEASE  8 February 2007  Ref: 38/07

    

  

Avian influenza outbreak update

  

The Government is developing its investigation into what might have caused the outbreak of avian influenza in the Suffolk poultry farm, following preliminary scientific tests showing the viruses in Suffolk and recent outbreaks in Hungary may well be identical.

 

Along with a number of other hypotheses Defra, the Food Standards Agency and the Health Protection Agency are investigating the possibility of a link between the Hungarian outbreaks, poultry meat from Hungary and the introduction of disease in the farm in Suffolk.

 

The investigation will include arrangements at the company’s adjacent plant for food processing.

 

Scientific advice remains that the risk to human health is negligible, and Food Standards Agency advice remains the same, that properly cooked poultry is safe to eat.

 

Deputy Chief Vet, Fred Landeg said:

 

“Our investigations have shown that one possible route of infection is poultry product imported from Hungary. It is important that this is investigated thoroughly, along with all the other possible routes. We are working in partnership with the Food Standards Agency and the Health Protection Agency to carry out a thorough investigation. We are also working in close contact with the Hungarian authorities and the European Commission.

 

“The company involved have voluntarily agreed to temporarily suspend the movement of poultry products between their outlets in the UK and Hungary until the investigation is complete."

 

Professor Pat Troop, Chief Executive of the Health Protection Agency said:

 

“We are continuing to work closely with Defra and the FSA. Should any public health issues arise as part of these investigations we will of course follow these up and carry out a full risk assessment to ensure the public are advised and protected. “

 

Dr Judith Hilton, Head of Microbiological Safety at the FSA said:

 

"Food Standards Agency advice has been and remains that avian flu does not pose a food safety risk for UK consumers."

 

 

 

[Guest]

OIE Website updated 9th Feb with two new H5N1 outbreaks:

 

 

Russia 12th January: Farmed Chickens, Ducks, Geese & Turkeys.

 

Turkey 5th February:  Backyard Chickens (742) Ducks (37) Geese (5) and pigeons (2).

[Guest]

DEFRA NEWS RELEASE   12 February 2007  Ref: 42/07

 

Avian influenza outbreak - update

  

Following meetings this afternoon on the outbreak of avian influenza in a Suffolk poultry farm, 9 days ago, Secretary of State, David Miliband said;

“On Saturday 3rd February the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza was confirmed on a poultry farm in Lowestoft. A 3 km Protection Zone and 10 km Surveillance Zone were imposed along with a wider Restricted Zone. The humane slaughter of the 159,000 birds on site began the same day, under the supervision of the State Veterinary Service (SVS) and was completed on the evening of Monday 5th February.

 

“I have today held meetings with my veterinary officials, representatives of the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and the Health Protection Agency (HPA). I have also met the Hungarian Ambassador and spoken with my Hungarian counterpart, Minister Graf.

 

“I received reports on three issues.

 

“First, containment and eradication of the disease. The SVS has been carrying out extensive surveillance in the restricted areas working closely with local authorities in Suffolk and Norfolk and other agencies. Any samples taken are being tested and no further cases of bird flu beyond those on the Infected Premises have been found. Following cleansing and disinfection on the Holton site the Meat Hygiene Service has re-licensed the slaughter house following the SVS inspection and clearance for reopening.

 

“Secondly, our investigation of the cause of the outbreak continues. Nothing I have been told changes the working hypothesis about the most likely route of transmission following the genetic sequencing results reported last Thursday, but all options remain under consideration. I expect a further report by the end of the week. Discussions are continuing with Bernard Matthews about biosecurity on their site.

 

“Our co-operation with the Hungarian Government remains intensive and constructive. Our vets are in regular touch and we are working together to identify the origin of this outbreak.”

 

Finally, on the public health aspects of the investigation Dame Deirdre Hutton commented:

 

“The investigation so far has not found anything that raises the risk to public health. It is still a possibility that infected poultry has entered the food chain but the risk to public health remains low.”

 

 

 

[Guest]

AI UPDATE – TUESDAY 13TH FEBRUARY

 

At 5 pm on Monday 12th February I sought an update from the policy team at DEFRA regarding lifting of restrictions.  I was advised that the incident in Suffolk was going well and, all things being equal, we could expect an announcement in about 2 weeks time that would in effect let bird gatherings (sales, shows, racing etc where birds are from more than one loft) be reinstated.  It was also hopeful that an announcement on continental racing be made at the same time. So far so good!  I went home, watched the BBC 6o/c news and nearly fell off the settee.  David Miliband, the Secretary of State announced that processing would recommence at the Bernard Matthews farm on Tuesday.

 

I could not wait to get to work on Tuesday as there were several questions that I believed DEFRA needed to answer.  The e mail I sent to the Deputy Chief Vet, copied to everyone in the stakeholder poultry group of which we are a member, said   “I have to say that I have found the announcement by David Miliband that processing at the Matthews plant can resume somewhat incredulous.  Mr Milliband has also stated that "our investigation of the cause of the outbreak continues. Nothing I have been told changes the working hypothesis about the most likely route of transmission following the genetic sequencing results reported last Thursday, but all options remain under consideration"

 

Excuse me for feeling rather cynical here but it would seem that the might of a large regional producer sat right in the middle of an infected premises is getting special dispensation to continue its financial activities.  What about all the other activities, financial as well as social, in other parts of the unaffected country?  I am sure that my colleagues in the Stakeholder Group would agree that their financial activities have been curtailed by the ban on gatherings.  My members will draw the same conclusions.

 

When then can we expect the current restrictions in the unaffected rest of the UK to be lifted?  From where I am sitting there is little risk from AI because if Matthews' plant is able to restart its activities yet you do not know for sure where the transmission came from, what sort off signal is that sending to Stakeholders? I would be interested to hear other stakeholder comments.”

 

I immediately received several e mails and one phone call from stakeholders offering support for my comments.  As we go to press, no word yet from DEFRA.  Watch this space!

 

 

Peter Bryant

General Manager

The Royal Pigeon Racing Association

The Reddings

[Guest]

OIE Website updated 13th Feb with three new H5N1 outbreaks:

 

 

Hungary 12th February: Geese, 1 outbreak; a farm 9km from original outbreak.

 

Turkey 12th February:  Backyard Chickens: 2 further outbreaks, different province.

[Guest]

Basically, restrictions remain in place only within the 3 Zones.

 

The previous General License has been re-issued 16th Feb, and permits racing within GB & Ireland only, but still excludes the Channel Islands (and France):-

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/disease/ai/keptbirds/genlicence.htm

 

The General Order giving effect to the Zones was also re-issued 16th Feb, and this represents a slippage of 9 days. Clarification needed on whether the original expected date of March 5th for 'all clear' has been pushed back 9 days too or does it still stand????

 

Still a very positive step forward and no worse than Cellardyke restrictions 2006.

[Guest]

Further statement in the House of Commons yesterday. Mostly no new news except that restrictions in the 3 zones are not now expected to be lifted until mid-March.

 

This confirms my suspicion that the re-issue of Licenses and Zone restrictions on 16th Feb means 9 days slippage in the original expected date of 5th March.

 

 

 

Oral statement by David Miliband on the avian influenza situation in Suffolk -

 

Monday 19 February 2007  

 

Mr Speaker with your permission I would like to make a statement on developments over the last two weeks in respect of the outbreak of avian influenza, 'bird flu', in Suffolk. I reported to the House on 5th February the initial scientific findings, and the planned response, and I can now set out developments in three areas: containment and eradication of the disease, investigation of its causes, and public information and public health.

 

First, containment of the outbreak. This required the culling and disposal of all turkeys on the site, preventative measures in a wider restricted area of over 2000 square kilometres, and extensive surveillance. I am sure, Mr Speaker, I speak for the whole House in expressing my gratitude to public servants from Defra, other government departments and agencies, local government, the police and health authorities, as well as farmers and business people, for the efficiency, coordination and rigour of this operation.  

 

Clinical signs of the infection emerge quickly and I am pleased to report that there have been no further outbreaks. 25 wild bird locations comprising 73 sites in the area are regularly being patrolled. Tests have been completed on 12 dead wild birds in the area as well as on live wild bird droppings from the infected premises. All results are negative. Domestic poultry in the Protection Zone have been located and clinically inspected by vets for signs of disease as have poultry premises considered most at risk in the Surveillance Zone. Tests have been completed on poultry samples from 21 premises in the Protection Zone. In all cases there has been no evidence of infection. The experts say that a period of two weeks from an outbreak is the time of greatest risk, but it is vital, as I will say at the end, that we do not in any way relax our guard

 

Mr Speaker, the House will remember that the outbreak took place in one of 22 turkey sheds. Further analysis revealed that although there had been no visible signs of disease, the virus was present in culled turkeys from three further sheds. Birds from all 22 sheds have been culled and the sheds have undergone preliminary cleansing and disinfection.  Restocking can only take place 21 days after completion of secondary cleansing and disinfection which is yet to take place. The part of the slaughterhouse where the turkeys were culled has been thoroughly cleansed and disinfected.  Following assessment by the State Veterinary Service and confirmation by the Meat Hygiene Service that it was ready to slaughter animals intended for human consumption, the slaughterhouse was reinstated and designated on 11 February and re-opened on the 12 February.

 

Following scientific advice, restrictions in respect of shooting in the protection and surveillance zones as well as the national gatherings ban were lifted on 16 February. In accordance with the legislation the earliest we would be able to lift the Restriction Zones in Suffolk is in the second week in  March, provided there are no further outbreaks or suspect cases under investigation in the area.

 

Our second area of work, Mr Speaker, has been to find the cause of the outbreak. I reported to the House on 5th February that the most likely cause involved wild birds, but that all avenues were being explored. This was consistent with the record of all past outbreaks and the scientific advice at the time.

 

Further genetic analysis took place during the week of 5 February, and on 8th February the Deputy Chief Vet informed ministers that the UK case came not just from the same family of bird flu as the Hungarian case, but that the genetic match was effectively identical. On 13th February the VLA confirmed that the genetic match was 99.96%.  These genetic findings were significant because if wild birds had transmitted the disease, then the virus would have mutated and thereby changed its genetic make-up.  It is for this reason that since 8th February, our working hypothesis has been that the spread of the virus was associated with the import of poultry products from Hungary. It is important to emphasise, again, that this working hypothesis is not being pursued to the exclusion of other possibilities.

 

Mr Speaker, we are examining all possible routes of transmission, but our investigation of the cause of the incident has focussed on transport links between Hungary and the site in Holton, and at biosecurity at the site. Our current understanding is summarised in two reports, involving the Food Standards Agency, Health Protection Agency, Meat Hygiene Service as well as Defra, published on 16 February. Copies of these reports are available in the library of the House and in the Vote Office.

 

These reports found that that there is no evidence that meat from the restricted areas in Hungary has entered the UK food chain. They also state that the risk to workers at the site was very low indeed. However, they show a number of ways in which infection could have entered the turkey sheds, carried from waste products by birds or rodents or on footwear and clothing. These possible pathways for infection make clear the importance of excellent biosecurity practices by all poultry keepers whether large or small. I am assured that waste products on the site are currently being dealt with in a satisfactory way.

 

Mr Speaker, there remain restrictions on trade from restricted areas of the British and Hungarian outbreaks, but outside these zones intra-community trade is now normal. It is important that I record my thanks for the help of the Hungarian Ambassador to this country and my Hungarian opposite number for their co-operation in this inquiry. Complex cases like this depend on close international cooperation and this has been forthcoming. I can also report that last week the first of a programme of three-way discussions involving UK and Hungarian vets and the European Commission took place; tomorrow I will be in Brussels for the Environment Council and I am seeking a meeting with the Commissioner responsible for Health and Consumer Protection.

 

Mr Speaker, the third part of our work has focussed on public health and public information. In this we are much helped by the role of the Food Standards Agency, which has been able to provide independent advice from the outset. This advice has been consistent: properly cooked meat poses no risk to consumer safety.

 

Mr Speaker, our response to this serious outbreak is far from over. Preventative measures remain in place and our epidemiological investigation continues. We will have decisions to take about any legal or financial consequences of the investigations currently underway. I am also determined that we try to learn any and all lessons following this outbreak.  This includes all aspects of the regulatory regime, domestic and international. Consistent with past practice, there is already work being done to learn the lessons of this outbreak, and when it is concluded it will be published for public scrutiny.

 

Mr Speaker, the expert advice available to me is that there is a constant low risk of bird flu to the UK, and higher risk during migration seasons. There can be no guarantee against further outbreaks; in fact the only guarantee is that there is a continual risk. That is why it is important that I reiterate my appeal to all poultry keepers to register with the Poultry Register, and to maintain the highest standards of biosecurity. I am grateful to the British Poultry Council, other trade associations and  professional bodies for their support in promulgating this message.

 

Mr Speaker, throughout the last 18 days I have stuck to two clear requirements - to be guided by scientific evidence and to enforce and follow carefully established rules.  Scientific evidence is important because in my view the only basis for public confidence is that Ministers are guided by expert and where possible independent advice. The rules for controlling and stamping out disease are important because they represent the best thinking at international level on what is sensible. I believe that this approach has so far delivered the right results in this case, and I will continue it in the future.

  

 

 

[Guest]

AI – the latest 22 February 2007  

 

As of 16 February, the ban on bird gatherings in the non-restricted parts of England has been lifted and gatherings are permitted again under general licence. The ban will remain in place within the entirety of the Restricted Zone, as per the legal requirements until further notice. (likely to be for another couple of weeks).

 

THE CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT DEFRA IS NOW CLARIFYING THE SITUATION IN THE CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES THAT WE RACE FROM. ONCE APPROVAL HAS BEEN GRANTED FROM FRANCE, BELGIUM ETC DEFRA WILL ISSUE A GENERAL LICENCE FOR RACING FROM THE CONTINENT.

 

For Northern Ireland  

 

DARD has decided to impose a precautionary ban on the movement of birds from the control areas in Great Britain to attend bird gatherings and pigeon races in Northern Ireland.

 

The ban on the movement of birds from Great Britain to attend bird gatherings and pigeon races in Northern Ireland has also been lifted.  

 

JERSEY

 

Will accept consignments of live birds, except from restriction zones.

 

 

Peter Bryant

[Tony C]

http://www.users.on.net/~anna.sanderson/humour/20070219_nhsannouncement.doc

[Guest bristolkev]

nice one tony ;D ;D

[Guest]

DEFRA NEWS RELEASE   Ref: 60/07

    

Date: 1 March 2007

  

  

Update on avian influenza outbreak in Suffolk

  

Defra today announced changes to the disease control measures put in place to tackle the H5N1 outbreak in Suffolk.

 

At 2pm today, 1 March, the specific Protection Zone (PZ) restrictions will be removed and will become part of the wider Surveillance Zone (SZ).

 

In addition, the requirement to house birds within all of the zones, including the Restricted Zone, will be lifted.

 

Defra has carried out enhanced surveillance of 148 premises of live poultry (including testing ducks and geese) and tested approximately 64 dead wild birds within the zones and tested faecal samples from the environment around the infected premises . This has not revealed the presence of disease outside the affected premises.

 

Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer Fred Landeg said:

 

“This is a positive step that has resulted from our work to stamp out the disease. However, we cannot afford to be complacent. We must remain vigilant and I must stress again how important it is for poultry keepers to practice good bio-security.”

 

Minister for Animal Health Ben Bradshaw said:

 

"I would like to thank the public and poultry keepers in the areas of Suffolk and Norfolk for their co-operation and understanding in helping us deal with the outbreak and prevent its spread."

 

 

 

[Guest]

DEFRA NEWS RELEASE   Ref: 70/07    

  

  

Final H5N1 restrictions lifted

  

Changes to Defra's disease control measures put in place to tackle the H5N1 outbreak in turkeys in Suffolk were announced today.

 

As of 00:01 on Monday 12th March, the Surveillance Zone (SZ) and Restricted Zone (RZ) restrictions will be lifted.

 

Specific restrictions previously in place within the zones, including movement restrictions and the ban on bird gatherings, have now been lifted.

 

Chief Veterinary Officer Debby Reynolds said:

 

“Although this marks the end of our active disease control measures in the affected area, there is still much work to be done. We will continue to investigate the source of the virus introduction and endeavour to learn from this outbreak to help us prevent and manage similar situations in the future.

 

Bird keepers should continue to practice good biosecurity and remain vigilant for signs of disease.”

 

Minister for Animal Health Ben Bradshaw said:

 

"The fact that we have no evidence of this disease spreading outside of the infected premises is a testament to our emergency response planning and implementation. I would like to pay tribute to the dedication and professionalism of all of the public servants who have been involved."

 

  

 

 

 

[gangster]

AND A BIG THANKS TO BERNARD MATTHEWS FOR TRYING TO F..K...  EVERYONE ELSES LIVES UP AND PS HERES A BIG COMPO CHEQUE BERNARD GO SUN YOUR FAT OLD *expletive removed* UP IN SPAIN DONT WORRY ABOUT ANYBODY ELSE.........(verymad)(verymad)(verymad)(verymad)

[Guest]

AND A BIG THANKS TO BERNARD MATTHEWS FOR TRYING TO F..K...  EVERYONE ELSES LIVES UP AND PS HERES A BIG COMPO CHEQUE BERNARD GO SUN YOUR FAT OLD *expletive removed* UP IN SPAIN DONT WORRY ABOUT ANYBODY ELSE.........(verymad)(verymad)(verymad)(verymad)

 

I for one don't and won't buy his product. Seems there's a few like me too.

 

http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2007/03/06/102089/bernard-matthews-fights-fall-in-consumer-confidence.html

[gangster]

  ITS SOME OF THE CARELESS STATEMENTS BY THE BERNARD MATTHEWS COMPANY THAT REALLY GOT TO ME THEY CAUSED THE OUTBREAK BUT TRIED TO JUSTIFY THERE ACTIONS ALSO CLAIMING THEY STOPPED IMPORTING THEN STARTED STRAIGHT AWAY.....UTTER CONTEMPT FOR EVERYONE S WELFARE ONLY BOTHERED BY PROFIT MARGINS.......I WONT BUY THERE PRODUCTS KNOWINGLEY AGAIN................... > > > > >

[Guest Vic]

Hear! Hear! Mick, Well put!        I'll second that.  Vic.

[Guest]

DEFRA NEWS RELEASE   Ref: 82/07

    

Date: 16 March 2007

  

  

Ban on international pigeon racing to be lifted

  

The ban on pigeon racing from Western Europe will be lifted on 1st April 2007, Defra announced today.

 

A ban on pigeon racing from outside the British Isles was originally imposed in October 2005 (apart from a brief lower risk period in June to August 2006) following a veterinary risk assessment.

 

The end of the higher risk autumn migration and over-wintering period, coupled with the absence of evidence of disease in wild birds in Europe, has led to a revised veterinary risk assessment which has informed the decision to lift the ban from 1 st April 2007.

 

Pigeon racing from Western Europe will still be subject to the existing conditions on domestic races of notifying in advance, record keeping and biosecurity. There will be an additional requirement for all returning birds to be kept in isolation from other birds for seven days. Birds should also be regularly inspected for signs of disease.

 

All restrictions, including on bird gatherings, in Suffolk and Norfolk following the outbreak of avian influenza in turkeys were lifted on 12 March in line with European legislation. Epidemiological investigations have found little evidence of the involvement of wild birds in that outbreak and there have been no cases detected in wild birds in Europe since August.

 

Defra will keep the risk assessment under constant review and would consider new restrictions if the avian influenza disease situation in wild birds changes.

 

Debby Reynolds, Chief Veterinary Officer, said:

 

“The lifting of the ban on pigeon racing from 1 st April is an appropriate response to our assessment of the level of risk of disease from wild birds. However we are keeping this risk under review and there is a constant low-level risk of avian influenza. Therefore I urge all bird owners and pigeon racers to be vigilant and maintain high standards of biosecurity.”

 

 

 

[THE FIFER]

AND A BIG THANKS TO BERNARD MATTHEWS FOR TRYING TO F..K...  EVERYONE ELSES LIVES UP AND PS HERES A BIG COMPO CHEQUE BERNARD GO SUN YOUR FAT OLD *expletive removed* UP IN SPAIN DONT WORRY ABOUT ANYBODY ELSE.........(verymad)(verymad)(verymad)(verymad)

 

 

 

 

         BOOTIFULL :-/ :-/ :-/ :-/ :-/ :-/ :-/

 

 

[Pompey Mick]

Here is the ,Risk Assessment' used by DEFRA. More like a 'No risk assessment, to me. The statement that pigeons have shed the virus in laboratory tests is one we haven,t been aware of before. As for the possibility of mechanical transfer, that's pure guesswork.

The need for a 7 Day Isolation period for birds returning in race time is tenuous and needs to be overturned for the sake of Channel Club racing.

 

 

  Avian influenza (bird flu) - Veterinary advice on methods to reduce the likelihood of the transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) for the gathering and flying of pigeons

 

Disease surveillance & control

 

 

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See also

 

Biosecurity

 

Exotic Notifiable Disease Investigations

 

Qualitative Risk Assessments

 

Customer Information Notes

 

Poultry Register

 

Personal food & plant imports

 

  Risk questions addressed in this document

What are the risks of spreading HPAI infection through events involving the gathering and flying of pigeons in the British Isles and from continental Europe.

 

What risk management options are available for reducing these risks?

 

Introduction

This document represents current veterinary opinion based on the disease situation and the available epidemiological evidence at the time of publication.

 

Transmission of avian influenza viruses between susceptible birds occurs mainly through direct close contact with infective excretions and secretions, particularly faeces.

 

Spatial spread of HPAI infection can occur through:

 

Movement of infective birds.

Movement of fomites e.g. cages, clothes and footwear contaminated with infective faeces.

Evidence suggests that live poultry, captive birds and wild birds may play a role in the spatial and temporal spread of HPAI viruses.

 

There is emerging evidence, albeit circumstantial, that wild birds may have the potential to act as a disease reservoir for HPAI H5N1.

 

The overall risk of exposure to HPAI H5N1 in Great Britain is currently low.

 

Objective

To reduce the risk of spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza infection by domesticated pigeons (Columba livia) gathered together for the purposes of flying.

 

Summary of risk factors

The risk factors that need to be taken into account are:

 

Susceptibility of pigeons to infection with HPAI viruses and the ability of pigeons to carry, excrete and transmit HPAI viruses.

The risk that pigeons have been infected with HPAI viruses in the few days prior to a gathering or flight and are not showing clinical signs of disease.

The risk of spread of infection between pigeons at the gathering prior to release for a flight.

The risk of spread of infection via contaminated shoes and clothes of persons attending to the pigeons prior to the flight.

The risk that HPAI infection is present in wild or domestic birds in areas where pigeons are released for flight, in areas that they may fly through, or areas that they may rest in during a flight.

The risk that pigeons have direct or indirect contact with wild birds or domestic poultry during a race and spread HPAI viruses.

The risk that infected pigeons returning from a flight may spread infection to other pigeons.

General

 

Pigeon racing

The pigeon racing season begins in April and finishes in early October. Most races take place during the summer months. International races are scheduled for mid summer when day length allows birds to cover greater distances in a day.

 

Pigeon fanciers keep their birds in ‘lofts’. Prior to a race fanciers belonging to a pigeon racing club will gather their birds at their club where the birds are given a rubber race ring, placed in release crates and transported to the liberation site for release. For larger races pigeons that have been gathered at club level will then be taken to another location and loaded on to transporters with birds from other clubs for release.

 

For UK races birds are usually liberated within 24 hours of being placed in the release crates and for the longer international races birds are usually released within 72 hours. However if there is a delay to the start of the race, possibly due to adverse weather, this period may be extended.

 

Following release, for races within GB, birds are expected to return to their loft within 24 hours. For longer international races this period may be up to 72 hours (birds returning from southern France or from Spain may rest on the northern coast of France when night falls).

 

There are exceptions to this; a small number of weaker or disorientated birds may return several days after the others or return to a different loft altogether. Factors such as adverse weather may delay a large number of birds from returning within the expected timeframe.

 

In addition to organised races pigeons are also gathered together for training flights. This may be done on an informal basis. Birds from several lofts may be gathered together and transported to a location for release. Training flights begin in advance of the racing season.

 

Assessment of the risk

Risk factors

Susceptibility of pigeons to infection with HPAI viruses and the ability of pigeons to carry, excrete and transmit HPAI viruses.

There is variable evidence from laboratory and surveillance activities demonstrating pigeons to be susceptible to HPAI infection and disease.

 

A number of laboratory studies have indicated that pigeons have a low susceptibility to HPAI infection. However, pigeons have been demonstrated to be susceptible to Asian lineage HPAI H5N1. Viral shedding has also been demonstrated in some laboratory studies.

 

To date, available evidence suggests that pigeons have not contributed significantly to spreading HPAI viruses.

 

Current expert opinion, as supported by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) Expert Group report, suggests that pigeons may have the potential to act as one of the potential ‘bridging’ species between waterfowl and poultry i.e. that they may transfer disease from infective waterfowl to poultry.

 

A preliminary analysis of findings from the European wild bird survey programme indicates that between 1st February and 31st May 2006 there were no detections of HPAI H5N1 in pigeons in EU Member States. However the number of pigeons tested was only a very small proportion of the total. This does not provide sufficient evidence to support pigeons as a ‘non risk species’ with regard to HPAI H5N1 spread.

 

At present, there is not a substantial evidence base to define susceptibility of pigeons to Asian lineage HPAI H5N1. There is an uncertain level of risk that infected pigeons may spread HPAI following infection.

 

Mechanical spread of infective faecal material over short distances is a possibility. The risk of mechanical spread decreases with distance. Therefore when HPAI viruses are circulating in wild birds or poultry, carriage of infective material (i.e. faeces from infective birds) on the feet and feathers (mechanical spread) of pigeons is a potential, but low risk.

 

The risk that pigeons have been infected with HPAI viruses in the few days prior to a gathering or flight and are not showing clinical signs of disease.

Avian influenza is a notifiable disease in racing pigeons. Any person suspecting avian influenza in racing pigeons has a legal obligation to notify the State Veterinary Service (SVS).

 

Pigeons are regularly inspected by their owners; they are also checked individually when being placed in a crate prior to release at a liberation site.

 

It is likely that clinical disease would be detected by the owner or race handler.

 

The incubation period is the time interval from initial infection until the onset of clinical disease.

 

Incubation periods can vary depending on factors such as species, age, general health and viral dose. The maximum incubation period for Notifiable Avian Influenza as defined by the OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) is set at 21 days. The average incubation period is 3-5 days.

 

During this period, if birds are infected, they will not show clinical signs of disease; infection would remain undetected.

 

Asymptomatic infection is also a possibility in infected pigeons, although there is insufficient evidence to define this risk.

 

Therefore it is possible that pigeons that have been exposed to an infective dose of avian influenza viruses prior to a race or gathering may be infected with avian influenza but not show signs. It would be expected that most birds would show signs within 3-5 days of infection. However some birds may take significantly longer to develop clinical disease than others.

 

The risk of spread of infection between pigeons at the gathering prior to release for a flight.

Prior to a race pigeons from several different lofts are placed into release crates. Pigeons remain in the crates for the duration of the journey to the liberation site. For international races this period may last up to approximately 72 hours, for GB races this is unlikely to be longer than 24 hours (source RPRA). If infection is present, there is a higher risk of spread owing to the increased contact between birds. The risk increases with the length of time birds remain in the crates. Infection may also be spread by contaminated crates or utensils.

 

It is normal practice for individual birds to be checked for signs of disease when being placed into the crates.

 

If infective birds are present this period represents a higher risk for disease transmission between pigeons in release crates from different lofts.

 

The risk of spread of infection via contaminated shoes and clothes of persons attending to the pigeons prior to the flight.

There is a risk that infection may be spread on contaminated clothing or objects. The risk will be greater for people that have recently been in contact with poultry, other captive birds or wild birds. The risk will be greater from those that have visited higher risk areas and had contact with birds.

 

Contaminated litter accumulated at the gathering is also a risk for disease spread.

 

These risks can be mitigated by the adoption of effective biosecurity measures.

 

The risk of spread of infection via contaminated litter and shoes and clothes of persons attending to pigeons is low if good biosecurity practices are maintained.

 

The risk that HPAI infection is present in wild or domestic birds in areas where pigeons are released, in areas that they may fly through, or areas that they may rest in during a flight.

Apart from a case in Cellardyke, Scotland where HPAI H5N1 virus was isolated from a dead wild Whooper swan (sampled on 31st March ’06), there have been no confirmed isolations of HPAI viruses in wild birds in the UK during 2006 or 2007, despite enhanced surveillance.

 

As of 05/03/07 the outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in turkeys in Holton, Suffolk (confirmed on 03/02/07) does not appear to be associated with infected wild birds or other UK domestic poultry or captive birds.

 

EU Member States are required to notify detections of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds or domestic poultry to the European Commission. Information for wild birds is published on the EU Animal Disease Notification System website.

 

Surveillance activities in domestic poultry and wild birds in EU Member States aim to detect any HPAI infection early.

 

There were widespread and sporadic detections of HPAI H5N1 viruses in dead wild birds and poultry in European Member States during the spring and summer months of 2006.

 

Since then there have been 2 confirmed outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 Asian lineage in domestic free range geese in Hungary (most recent 30/01/07) and 1 confirmed outbreak in indoor poultry in the UK (03/02/07).

 

There has not been a confirmed detection of HPAI H5N1 in EU Member States in wild birds since August 3rd 2006.

 

The consensus of opinion amongst national and European experts, including epidemiologists and ornithologists, is that the detection of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds in Europe is more likely during the autumn migration and over wintering period of migratory water bird species. These birds normally begin arriving in mainland Europe during autumn (August/September); they remain (‘over winter’) in Europe until the spring time (March/April). This may vary on an annual basis depending on climatic conditions.

 

Surveillance is a useful tool for detecting avian influenza occurrence in wild birds. However it has limitations; sample sizes are small in relation to the true wild bird population and therefore unlikely to provide an accurate estimate of prevalence. Negative findings provide evidence to support absence of disease, but it cannot be assumed that an area is free from disease in wild birds when HPAI viruses have not been detected. There is a possibility that infection in wild birds may go undetected.

 

There is ongoing wild bird surveillance across Europe. It can be assumed that the likelihood of HPAI infections in wild birds will be greater in areas where these viruses have been detected. Areas known to receive significant numbers of wild birds (of species thought to play a role in HPAI spread) from affected regions are also at an increased risk.

 

The risk that HPAI infection is present in wild or domestic birds in areas where pigeons are released, in areas that they may fly through, or areas that they may rest in during a race depends on the disease situation at the time of the race.

 

The risk that pigeons have direct or indirect contact with wild birds or domestic poultry during a flight.

Pigeons may rest during a race if they encounter adverse weather conditions, during a long distance race or at dusk. This provides an opportunity for racing pigeons to mix with wild birds (including feral pigeons) or poultry kept outdoors, or come into contact with a contaminated environment. If avian influenza infection is prevalent in an area there is the possibility that pigeons may be infected directly by contact with infective birds or indirectly through contact with a contaminated environment*.

 

There is the possibility that pigeons may clash with other wild birds in flight, although this is very unlikely to result in disease spread.

 

*The survivability of AI viruses in the environment depends on factors such as the nature of the environment, level of contamination, ambient temperature, presence of water, pH of water and intensity of sunlight. Wetland areas harbouring large numbers of infective birds will provide a better environment for survivability of AI viruses than warmer arid areas.

 

Some pigeons become disorientated during a race or are weaker. These pigeons may arrive at their loft significantly later than their loft mates. The likelihood of contact with wild birds or extensively kept poultry en route will be greater.

 

The risk that pigeons have direct or indirect contact with wild birds during a race is variable. In optimal conditions for longer races the risk will be higher than for short races. Adverse weather causing birds to be grounded en route will lead to a greater risk of such contact.

 

The risk that infected pigeons returning from a flight may spread infection to other pigeons.

It is unlikely that diseased birds would complete a longer race and return to their loft.

 

However the average incubation period for HPAI is 3-5 days. The duration of longer international pigeon races is rarely greater than 72 hours. Therefore pigeons that become infected during a race are likely to return to their loft before showing clinical signs.

 

There is also the possibility of asymptomatic infection, although there is insufficient evidence to define this risk.

 

The level of contact between pigeons within a loft is high. This provides a good opportunity for disease spread between birds.

 

If pigeons were to become infected just prior to a race or during a race through contact with infective wild birds or a contaminated environment there is a risk that infection will spread through the loft when infective birds return.

 

Summary

Although evidence from some studies suggests that pigeons have a relatively low susceptibility to HPAI viruses, infection in pigeons has been demonstrated.

 

It is difficult to estimate the probability of contact between pigeons and wild birds but the likelihood of such contact will be greater during races that are longer in terms of time and distance. Delays in return due to events such as adverse weather conditions are also more likely during longer races.

 

Pigeon racing from outside Great Britain carries a greater risk for introduction of HPAI than racing within Great Britain.

 

It is recommended that pigeon races do not take place from or through areas where there are known to be or have recently been confirmed cases of HPAI in wild birds or domestic poultry, or areas that are linked to these by a likely route of disease spread. This should take into account the geographical distribution of confirmed cases and the distribution of areas at higher risk. The period after which an area is deemed to be safe for pigeon racing will depend on an individual risk assessment taking into account the topography of the area, population density of higher risk water bird species and level of surveillance in the area.

 

Seasonal risk should also be taken into account; based on current available evidence and expert opinion the risk of HPAI H5N1 occurrence in wild birds in mainland Europe will be greater during autumn migration and over wintering period of wild bird species thought to be more likely to play a role in the spread of HPAI H5N1.

 

HPAI H5N1 outbreak in turkeys in Holton (03/02/07):

As of 5th March 2007 there is no evidence to suggest that this outbreak is associated with the circulation of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds or other UK domestic poultry or captive birds. Despite enhanced wild bird and poultry surveillance in the Suffolk and Norfolk area - following the outbreak - no HPAI viruses were detected. Surveillance and epidemiological findings supporting the absence of HPAI H5N1 - in poultry, captive birds or wild birds - from this area will inform the lifting of final restrictions.

 

There is no evidence to suggest that wild birds in the area were infected prior to the outbreak and no evidence to suggest that the virus was circulating in wild birds after the outbreak as a result of ‘spill over’.

 

Since there does not appear to be involvement of infected wild birds or other UK domestic poultry or captive birds in this outbreak the overall risk posed by pigeon racing remains unchanged as a result of the outbreak.

 

Conclusions

There is not a substantial evidence base to accurately define the level of risk that pigeons pose to spreading Asian lineage HPAI H5N1. However pigeons have been demonstrated to be susceptible to these viruses.

 

It is recommended that flying of pigeons should not take place in or through areas where HPAI is circulating in poultry or wild birds. This can also be applied to areas that, on the basis of a risk assessment, are deemed to be high risk.

 

Pigeon racing should therefore not take place from or through areas where there have recently been confirmed cases of HPAI in wild birds or domestic poultry or areas that are known to be linked to these by likely routes of disease spread.

 

Keith Hamilton, Veterinary Exotic Diseases, Research and Official Controls Division, 5th March 2007.

 

 

 

References

Narayan, O., Lang, G. and Rouse, S.T. (1969). A new influenza A virus infection in turkeys. IV Experimental susceptibility of domestic birds to virus strain ty/Ontario/7732/1966. Archiv fur die gesamte Virusforschung, 26, 149-165.

 

Slemons, R.D. & Easterday, B.C. (1972). Host response differences among five avian species to an influenza virus – A/turkey/Ontario/7732/66 (Hav5N?). Bulletin WHO 47, 521-525.

 

Panigrahy, B., Senne, D.A., Pedersen, J.C., Shafer, A.L. & Pearson, J.E. (1996). Susceptibility of pigeons to avian influenza. Avian Diseases 40, 600-604.

 

Perkins, L.E.L. & Swayne, D.E. (2002) Pathogenicity of a Hong Kong-origin H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus for emus, geese, ducks and pigeons Avian Diseases 46, 53-63.

 

Nettles, V.F., Wood, J.M. & Webster, R.G. (1985) Wildlife surveillance associated with an outbreak of lethal H5N2 avian influenza in domestic poultry. Avian Diseases 29, 733-741.

 

 

HPAI information on the OIE website

Animal Disease Notification System

European Food Safety Authority

 

  

    

    Page last modified: March 16, 2007

  

 

 

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[Guest]

David Glover refers to this report in his Article p42, BHW 30th March. This is a full copy of it, minus pictures which you can get at web address:-

 

http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=22

 

Bird flu: a bonanza for 'Big Chicken'

GRAIN

 

The bird flu crisis rages on. One year ago, when governments were fixated on getting surveillance teams into wetlands and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) was waving the finger of blame at Asia and Africa's abundant household poultry, GRAIN and other groups pointed out that large-scale industrial poultry farms and the global poultry trade were spreading bird flu -- not wild birds nor backyard flocks. Today, this has become common knowledge, even though little is being done to control the industrial source of the problem, and governments still shamelessly roll out the wild bird theory to dodge responsibility. Just a few weeks ago, Moscow authorities blamed migratory birds for an outbreak near the city -- in the middle of the Russian winter.

 

A more sinister dimension of the bird flu crisis, however, is becoming more apparent. Last year, we warned that bird flu was being used to advance the interests of powerful corporations, putting the livelihoods and health of millions of people in jeopardy. Today, more than ever, agribusiness is using the calamity to  consolidate its farm-to-factory-to-supermarket food chains as its small-scale competition is criminalised, while pharmaceutical companies mine the goodwill invested in the global database of flu samples to profit from desperate, captive vaccine markets. Two UN agencies -- FAO and the World Health Organisation (WHO) -- remain at the centre of this story, using their international stature, access to governments and control over the flow of donor funds to advance corporate agendas.

 

Slaughtering the small poultry sector

Authorities in charge of dealing with bird flu are finally acknowledging the role played by the poultry trade in spreading the virus. This is long overdue. The first bird flu outbreaks in Southeast Asia -- Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Indonesia -- occurred in closed, intensive factory farms. But thorough investigations were never made into why the disease broke out on those farms and how it subsequently spread from there. The same goes for Turkey and Egypt, where wild birds and backyard flocks were quickly condemned while the poultry companies, which supplied markets and "backyard" producers with birds as the disease raged through the industry, were left off the hook. Even in South Korea, with healthy free-range poultry roaming next toh factory farms hit by the disease, authorities are obsessed with the role of wild birds. It was only in the UK this past February that the myth that large farms are "biosecure" was shattered and the shroud concealing the many ways that bird flu spreads through the transnational poultry industry was torn off. Government officials at first blamed wild birds for the outbreak on a large factory farm owned by poultry giant Bernard Matthews and the company dismissed media reports about a possible link with its operations in Hungary, saying that these were far from the area in that country where bird flu recently broke out. But both explanations fell apart when a government inspector found a wrapper on the company's UK premises proving that meat from a slaughterhouse in Hungary's bird-flu infected area had indeed been processed at the UK factory farm just prior to the outbreak.

 

Yet back in the Asian epicentre of the crisis, the message to poultry farmers is still, "Get big, really big, or get out." In 2006, Vietnam, under a joint government-UN programme, laid out a ten-year plan to, in the words of its Minister of Agriculture, turn its poultry sector "into a modern, large-scale industry in terms of farming, slaughter and consumption.”  The government began with a ban on live poultry in urban centres, putting an end to thousands of backyard stocks. Then new regulations on trade and on poultry slaughtering in residential areas came into effect. Small-scale markets and butchers were shut down, and slaughterhouses were moved to a few licensed facilities on the outskirts of the cities. In Ho Chi Minh City, over 200 local markets sold chicken before the bird flu crisis; today, chicken can be legally sold only by supermarkets or factory farm “selling points”. The number of slaughterhouses in the city has plummeted from 50 to three. The changes are devastating small-scale producers because the supermarkets and new slaughterhouses sell only poultry that is certified according to standards that small farmers cannot comply with. The three or four companies that control Vietnam's industrial poultry production thus not only get captive urban markets; they also get a low-wage labour force of displaced peasants for their expanded production and slaughtering.

 

The restructuring is fast becoming a boon for the company that probably first brought bird flu to Vietnam. "Charoen Pokphand (CP) will succeed in turning a crisis into an opportunity of development," says Sooksunt Jiumjaiswanglerg, president of CP Vietnam Livestock. The giant Thai-based multinational corporation, which supplies fast-food chains in Asia like KFC, controls around 80 per cent of Vietnam's industrial chicken production and anticipates its growth in the country to climb 30 per cent per year. Within Vietnam, CP is the main supplier to the French-owned BigC supermarket chain and is in the midst of opening more than 100 of its own CP Fresh Mart shops and 200-300 CP roast chicken stalls.

Yet in a nation where an estimated 80 per cent of the country's poultry production was at least until recently in the hands of small scale producers and over 70 per cent of Vietnamese households keep poultry, it is no wonder that many independent poultry raisers are simply taking their chances and going underground. Speaking to IPS News, Phan Anh Tam, a small-scale free-range duck farmer from the south-western Vietnamese province of Tay Ninh whose entire flock was culled during the 2003 outbreak, explained that he had little choice but to break the new laws and keep on farming. "If they want to kill them, they'll be killing my children, because these ducks are my means of feeding them," the father of five said.

 

Despite their "expert" status, those trying to outlaw backyard poultry are not acting on evidence. The only peer-reviewed study to compare the risks between family farms and industrial operations, based on data from the bird flu outbreaks in Thailand in 2004, found that "backyard flocks are at a significantly lower risk of [bird flu] infection compared to commercial-scale operations of broiler or layer chickens or quail." Nor are these "experts", or the government officials following their advice, responding to the needs of the vast majority of the affected people. If people are defying orders to kill off their flocks, it is not because they do not understand the potential dangers of the disease. It is because their immediate livelihoods are at stake and, compensated or not, they cannot afford to shop at supermarkets.

 

This is a major reason why the FAO and the industry are having such a hard time imposing standardised approaches. Thailand acted mainly to protect its export industry, so it avoided vaccination and concentrated on mass culling and restructuring. China and Vietnam ignored international advice and decided on mass vaccination. Other countries, such as Nigeria, are treading water, struggling to figure out how to please the donors and the industry without triggering a revolt among the masses whose livelihood and food security depend on the traditional systems of poultry production.

 

Troubles with the recipe in Indonesia

Things are particularly tricky in Indonesia, where bird flu is wreaking the most damage. On the one hand, the central government is trying to appease the donors and big business by following the Vietnamese and Thai examples. It called for a mass cull and a ban on live birds that came into effect on 1 February 2007 in Jakarta and the nine other provinces where bird flu is most entrenched. The Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supar, even declared that the bans would soon cover the entire archipelago. New regulations for breeding, slaughter and retail of poultry are also being developed behind closed doors between industry, government and UN agencies. In a clear sign of what is to come, Jakarta has already designated sites for the relocation of slaughterhouses, storage facilities and bird markets. Using words that could just as easily have been uttered by his Vietnamese counterpart, Agriculture Minister Anton Apriyantono told reporters, "Poultry farms must eventually be integrated with poultry slaughterhouses."

 

On the other hand, the government leaves big industry alone. For the large-scale commercial farms -- where, despite their incessant denials, bird flu remains a problem -- everything is voluntary. Worse, the government and the public can do little but 'accept' what the industry tells them because there is still a law on the statute book that prevents inspections of factory farms without the company's permission. If such a law existed in the UK, we would never have known the source of the major outbreak which that country has just suffered.

 

Of course, the Indonesian government's top-down measures are totally out of tune with the daily lives of the people. So, many people are just ignoring them. Hence the government's frequent reliance on the military to sweep in and get the job done. In Jakarta, less than a day after the ban went into effect live birds could again be purchased almost everywhere.

 

"Traditional poultry practices are deeply rooted in our culture and they are critical to peoples' livelihoods," explains Riza Tjahjadi of Jarkata-based Biotani Indonesia Foundation. "The government has a huge struggle on its hands if expects people to give up their birds and neighbourhood markets for frozen chicken from supermarkets."

 

Indeed, people are starting to mobilise. On 27 February 2007, Sebindo (Serikat Buruh Informal Indonesia or Indonesia Informal Labour Union) staged a protest during a meeting of the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle, led by former President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The protest was part of Sebindo's campaign to provide more realistic information to the public about bird flu and press the government to take more coherent action. They blame both the government and the media for creating a deeply erroneous understanding of the problem.

 

Through the mass cull order, they say, "Indonesia's small scale poultry industry has been declared the enemy and judged guilty". As a result, the country is persecuting its own people and traditions. Further, with the order to relocate and integrate the poultry industry, the government is deliberately pushing the country into dependency on a few large industrial farms plus foreign imports, with no guarantee that either option will bring freedom from bird flu. Overall, the country is perniciously being told to blame itself, destroy its poultry sector and traditions and rely instead on the transnational poultry industry, when the better solution, the union says, is to promote healthier living and real biosecurity.

 

Local governments across the islands, faced with popular resistance, are also ignoring central directives from Jakarta. The governor of Central Java, with poultry farmers and traders threatening mass protests, has so far refused to carry out the central directive to ban and cull backyard birds, citing the impacts on people's food security. In Yogyakarta, the provincial parliament has to contend with veterinarians, farmers and students from the Forum Peduli Perunggasan Indonesia (Forum of Concern for Indonesian Poultry) protesting on its steps for a rejection of the mass cull policy and in support of backyard poultry and poultry diversity.

 

Agribusiness clearly suffers, at least in the short-term, when bird flu breaks out. But, whether in Indonesia or Russia, India or Egypt, governments and the various international agencies have quickly come to the industry's defence, and have even managed to turn the bird flu crisis into an opportunity for the larger corporations to consolidate their control over the long term. These corporations, from CP in Thailand to Tyson in the US, have worked hard to ensure that this happens. In October 2005, the world's biggest poultry companies came together to form the International Poultry Council, in order urgently to defend and advance a unified position on bird flu policy. There is also the International Egg Commission -- a corporate lobby group with a similar mandate and membership base. Both organisations have official status and formal agreements with influential bodies like the FAO and the World Organisation for Animal Health, which gives them direct influence over bird flu policy development. Small-scale poultry producers and traders have no such access; they have been completely left out of decision-making processes, at both national and international levels, and it shows.

 

Privatising bird flu: the ultimate health threat

The same tensions are plaguing the human health side of the bird flu crisis. On 9 February 2007, news broke in the global media that Indonesia was cutting off the supply of local H5N1 (bird flu) virus samples to the WHO. As the story went, the Indonesian government had learned that an Australian firm, CSL, was developing a bird flu vaccine based on virus samples from Indonesia, which Jakarta had handed over to WHO, without any notification or request for permission. In revenge, the story went on, Jakarta was shutting the door on the WHO -- a mythical symbol of international cooperation in fighting any potential bird flu pandemic -- and cutting a private deal instead with a big US pharmaceutical company, Baxter International, since Baxter had agreed to produce and deliver vaccine to Indonesia on the government's terms.

 

Worldwide, but most noticeably in the West, people condemned and denounced Indonesia for this move. The government was swiftly accused of being greedy, misguided, short-sighted and nationalistic -- as if to say that Indonesia is obliged to give so that others may sell. That really stung, back in Jakarta. It was like colonial times all over again.

 

As the heat died down, and the WHO and the Indonesian Health Ministry signed a public relations peace agreement, it became clear that a lot of people had misunderstood what was going on and what was at stake.

 

Indonesia was not the first government to stop sending bird flu virus samples to the WHO. China had already done this. Besides, Indonesia stopped sending only physical samples of the virus from its territory. It didn't stop collecting materials and sending the sequence data to Geneva. Clearly, Jakarta was not trying to hold the rest of the world hostage. It was trying to address a pressing national problem.

The issue for the Indonesian government is that it needs an adequate supply of vaccine to deal with the public health timebomb it is sitting on. Indonesia has been the hardest hit, of all countries, by H5N1. The virus is endemic in its poultry population now; people continue to die from it (38 per cent of all reported human deaths from bird flu worldwide have been Indonesians), and this is the fourth most populous country in the world. The stakes are simply very high. The government has calculated that the global supply of any treatment will necessarily be limited; that it cannot and will not be able to afford most vaccines, especially in a time of penury which any pandemic will create; and that it needs a vaccine developed from local strains of the flu for greatest effectiveness. The WHO's system, in this respect, is leading nowhere for a country like Indonesia. The organisation expects its member states to send samples of all avian flu isolates, human and animal. The samples are kept in four WHO collaborating centres, conveniently located in the rich world (UK, Japan, US and Australia), while the data is fed into a password-protected database, located (where else but) in the United States. So a country like Indonesia is expected freely to hand over virus samples and let the big pharmaceutical manufacturers access the information to produce their own proprietary drugs. This is exactly what was happening with CSL. The whole power imbalance cemented into this system is grotesque.

 

When Indonesia said "no more", it was saying "this isn't fair". It is not right that poor countries supply 'raw materials', for free, to a global pharmaceutical industry that concentrates market power and reaps huge profits through monopoly privileges called patents, especially when it is the poor countries that are facing the biggest public health problems. What Indonesia has therefore been calling for, as have other countries struggling with the bird flu crisis, such as Thailand, is for the WHO and others to help them to develop the capacity to produce their own vaccines themselves. Patenting, which developing countries are being forced to accept and follow, will always block this. That is what it is supposed to do: stifle ("regulate") competition. That's why pharmaceutical giants like Syngenta, Novartis and Pfizer are fighting so ferociously right now in India, Thailand and the Philippines to prevent, as much as possible, compulsory licensing and generic manufacturing. The problem is a stark one of narrow commercial interests versus broad public interests. When developing countries, led by Thailand, tried to change the WHO's avian flu sample distribution system last June so that it would be restricted to non-commercial purposes, they were told flatly, “no”.

 

People are now starting to say, "Well, yes, Indonesia has a point. Any vaccine against a bird flu pandemic should be shared. And the technology to produce it should be shared. Avian influenza is a 'public health' problem requiring a 'public good' response." Correct. And in Indonesia, groups like the Sebindo union are flatly insisting that any human vaccine against bird flu should be free, not sold. But this won't happen -- or we'll get into this dilemma again and again and again -- unless people seriously challenge the patent system, which serves little purpose in the health field but to make rich drug company CEOs and their shareholders even richer. Tomorrow, when some lab patents the H5N1 virus itself, people will surely scream bloody murder. But tomorrow will be too late.

 

Punishing the poor

The response to the bird flu crisis is unfolding like a structural adjustment plan. Here too, big business and international agencies are using a calamity, fostered by the very models they ushered in, to maximise corporate profits and push forward even deeper reforms that will further squeeze the poor. But, much like the managers of the notorious structural adjustment plans that have so ravaged the South, the authorities managing the bird flu crisis are also rapidly losing legitimacy. More and more people are convinced that the official responses to bird flu have less to do with public health than with power politics. Local resistance is thus gradually building, giving rise to tensions between the various levels of government that have to contend with the anger of their people and the international agencies where corporate lobbies are entrenched. It is also why greater effort, including military force and economic sanctions, are now being used to impose central orders.

 

The corporate vision of globalised, fully integrated factory farms and slaughterhouses churning out standardised birds for supermarket shelves -- people already call it "Big Chicken" for the level of control being pushed -- is being drilled into decision makers more than ever. The threat of a bird flu pandemic is putting the vision into practice faster and deeper than could ever have been achieved without it. But the pain this is causing to those crushed under the reforms, not to mention the health risks that this poses to the entire planet, is overwhelming. The flip side of the corporate bonanza is that it is destroying the traditional poultry systems and poultry biodiversity that hundreds of millions of people depend on for their food security and livelihoods. In so doing, it is also wiping out the foundations for a long-term solution to bird flu. As we are starting to see in Indonesia and elsewhere, people simply have no choice but to resist.

________________________________________

Acknowledgements: Riza Tjahjahdi and volunteers of Biotani Foundation Indonesia generously helped with background research for this report (biotani@rad.net.id and biotani2004a@yahoo.com). The term 'Big Chicken' comes from Wendy Orent, a US anthropologist and science writer.

 

 

 

 

[Guest]

This is an extract from this week's View from the Reddings. In my opinion the info in the last paragraph is a major step forward, pigeon people commissioning their own research on pigeons and AI.  

 

Continental Racing and the Isolation Issue

 

Whilst no doubt the vast majority of fanciers are delighted that we have secured unrestricted distance continental racing I have received a few comments about the 7 day isolation period for pigeons racing from the continent.  I have asked DEFRA for an answer to those questions of why, without any cases of AI apparent on the continent, is there a requirement for isolation.  The response is as follows ‘Information about the incubation period can be found in the Risk Assessment on the web  the reasons for the seven day isolation period will be reflected in the Q&A pages on the DEFRA website.

 

The incubation period is the time interval from initial infection until the onset of clinical signs.  This ranges from a minimum to a maximum depending on factors such as the species of bird, age, health status, infectious dose etc.

 

Based on current data the OIE maximum incubation period for notifiable avian influenza is 21 days.  The average incubation is 3-5 days (with the maximum being up to 21 days)  therefore we assess that a safe margin is 7 days during which birds should be isolated from other birds and regularly inspected for signs of disease.  This condition aims to reduce the risk that birds that have been exposed to avian influenza viruses during the race, mix with and infect other birds before disease is detected.  It is crucial that birds are regularly inspected in this period and any suspicious signs are reported.  This measure reduces this risk but does not eliminate the risk; it makes the assumption that pigeons will show clinical signs of disease within the average incubation period.  The fact that there has been no AI in wild birds in Western Europe is the reason we are permitting racing at all.  As we have discussed, we still need to have some risk mitigation measures in view of the risk of undetected infection.  

 

Ministerial agreement that international racing could take place was only secured on the basis that there was an isolation period and we are not going to change this decision.’

 

This last sentence is pretty conclusive.  One area that gives hope on this is the fact that the FCI are conducting research on AI, research in which we have a stake.  Once the results of this is published then we may have an opportunity to go back to DEFRA to challenge the isolation factor.  The FCI, through its European Committee liaising with the EU Government, will be in a good position to pressure the EU into understanding conclusively that pigeons are not only a very small risk but no risk of passing on the disease.  Once we have this evidence it can only help our case against the isolation factor.  In the meantime the isolation period means that you cannot race the same bird on 2 consecutive weekends from the continent.  The continental licence is now available on the DEFRA website

 

 

[batusai]

Hope that ALL this will end SOON!.... it so bad to know that until the date I am wrinting my reply, our country STILL not LIFTING the ban in IMPORTING birds from UK due to AVIAN FLU....

 

 

thanks!

 

batusai!

[Guest]

:'(just heard on BBC news update 11.00am , investigating possible bird flu in North Wales ?????????  : : : :                                    andy :'(