AVIAN FLU

[Guest]

Doostalker and Preston Powerblast: I have started to put your bioplan advice into action from this morning by installing a Boot Wash outside my loft. I've also installed a paper bag over my head because I feel a right **%£ while using it ;D

Again Jimmy's Vanodine has a great feature - the colour tells you if it is still active. I wondered if it was the same with my Virkon boot wash or is there a time limit on its use. Next question: bearing in mind that this is a disease prevention rather than a disease containment arrangement  - how deep should the water be and am I safe enough pouring the old wash down the drain? Or will SEPA have something to say about that? I use Virkon to disinfect the drain anyway.

Another caution: If you have mobility problems take extra care using the boot wash. My basin is only big enough for one shoe at a time and stepping in and out with a drinker in each hand is quite a balancing act.  

[Webmaster]

WEBMASTER:

Would you ring fence the Avian Flu forum please and ensure that it is not deleted from the website. Would you also ensure KEY WORDS: Avian Influenza, Avian Flu, Bird Flu and Pigeons to ensure WEB Search Engines pick this conference up?

Thanks.

 

As I am the only person who has access to delete posts I can assure you that I won't delete this one

Keywords are more or less defunct as to have any effect on search engine placing, it is more about the actual content of the page (use those keywords lots in posts). I will submit this page to the major search engines, however this in itself may not help too much, Google has a ranking system 'Page Rank' which works on how many people link to the page; if other sites/pages link to this one that should improve its positioning in the rankings

 

Keep up the good work,

Webmaster

[preston powerblast]

Paper bag!!Hehe. :X

reminds me of when I'm fogging hen houses I wear a plastic hood.

You only need a shallow tray for a boot wash.

Any disinfectant is ok down the drain.

Most disinfectants are usually ok for three or four days some are said to be ok for a week.

Hope you put eye holes in the paper bag ;D

[fifestay]

Bruno thank you for all your Research and letters and info sharing well done also to Hyacinth prestonp/blast and Jimmy White not only informatibve but factual and a great resource for all fanciers ...time to mobilise ...what do we pay our unions for take it to club and fed /region level lets get people talking and lets ensure folk are clued up and ready to counter rumours or any unfair treatment.

Thanks Guys

[THE FIFER]

Well done to u all the info and directions from u all are first class a lot of work and searching around is out of this world, and not mentioning any names as we can see by thr posts who they are there is a load of 1st class information and tips, keep it up, my view (for what its worth after reading through the forum)  in any problem is to get at the cause at the start and deal with it their which is the wild birds which are going to bring it in, if a cull is going to come ie our birds , why not have it with the birds which are going to bring it in before they come, these birds are sitting somewhere known to the experts, this is if it is certain those birds are, can they not be tested before they migrate, i know its a terible thing a cull but if it is going to save others and possibly human lives, i think this is where the RSPB should come in , as this is thier moto to save wild birds.

[Guest]

[justify]ABSTRACT OF SCIENTIFIC PAPER KINDLY PROVIDED BY GORDON CHALMERS, DVM:

 

Title: Comparative Susceptibility of Selected Avian and Mammalian Species to a Hong Kong-Origin H5Nl Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus

 

Authors : Perkins, Laura;  Swayne, David

 

Submitted to: International Symposium On Avian Influenza

 

Publication Acceptance Date: February 5, 2002 Publication Date: April 17, 2002

Abstract only

 

Technical Abstract:

[justify]The H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak that occurred in Hong Kong in 1997 and the subsequent transmission of this virus from chickens to humans kindled the recognition of influenza A viruses as potentially zoonotic pathogens.(Bruno: a disease that can be transmitted from animals to people or, more specifically, a disease that normally exists in animals but that can infect humans.)

This unique H5N1 avian influenza (AI) virus is unmatched in its ability to transmit directly from chickens to humans and cause both substantial disease in poultry as well as human disease and fatality. [/justify]

A repertoire of avian and mammalian species was intranasally inoculated with the A/chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 (H5N1) AI virus (chicken/HK) in order to ascertain which species are susceptible to infection with this virus and to determine the pathobiology of disease (Bruno: Pathology, with emphasis on the pathogenetic mechanisms underlying human disease).

resultant from the infection.  Parameters evaluated in order to determine the rate and results of infection in each species included the daily morbidity and mortality, gross and histological lesions, (Bruno: the study of the structure of tissues) the distribution of viral antigen, and the frequency and titer of virus reisolation from selected tissues.  A total of nineteen species were used in this investigation.

Avian species included seven gallinaceous species, Pekin ducks (Anas platyrhynchos), Embden geese (Anser anser), emus (Dramaius novaeholiandiae), pigeons (Columba livia), budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulatus), zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata), and wild-captured house finches (Carpodacus mexicanus), house sparrows (Passer domesticus), European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris), and laughing gulls (Larus atricilia).

Mammalian species included domestic rats and rabbits.  

Four gradations of disease were observed among these avian and mammalian species.  These gradations included rapidly fatal systemic disease, severe neurological disease, asymptomatic infection to only mild transient disease, and an absence of clinical disease relative to only minimal or no productive viral replication.

The species most susceptible to infection included the seven gallinaceous species and the zebra finches, each of which suffered significant morbidity and mortality due to the viral infection.  The high pathogenicity of this virus for these species was confirmed by the demonstration of viral antigen in the vascular endothelium and parenchyma of multiple organs as well as the reisolation of high titers of virus from the brain, lung, and kidney.

Species which suffered severe neurological disease with mortality included the budgerigars and house finches, whereas the geese and emus also developed severe neurological disease but lacked mortality within the 14 day investigative period. The chicken/HK virus was reisolated most consistently from the brain of these four species, indicating that clinical disease directly correlated to the presence of viral antigen.  Pekin ducks, laughing gulls, and house sparrows could be with the virus.

 

However, clinical disease was not observed in the ducks or gulls, and only mild transient depression was observed in the house sparrows. Additionally, histological lesions were mild, viral antigen was rare, and virus reisolation was only obtained infrequently from the lung and/or kidney from these three species, indicating that the infection of these species was largely self-limiting.

In pigeons, starlings, rats, and rabbits, clinical disease was not observed, lesions and related viral antigen were absent in all examined tissues, and the virus was not or was only infrequently reisolated from the tissues collected. These results confirm that these species are largely resistant to infection with the chicken/HK virus.

In total, this investigation demonstrates that the HSN1 Hong Kong-origin virus can display a broad range of virulence from apathogenic to highly pathogenic among these selected avian and mammalian species, and distinct differences can occur in the susceptibility of avian species, even those which are members of the same order.

 

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_N0_ 115=134065[/justify]

 

Bruno: Dr Chalmers made refernce to this work in the Frazier Valley case and his letter to the BHW 12th August 05.

 

[Guest]

Gordon Chalmers has uncovered a typing error in the script sent to us and posted before:

 

"Pekin ducks, laughing gulls, and house sparrows could be with the virus" should read:

 

Pekin ducks, laughing gulls, and house sparrows could be INFECTED with the virus.

 

 

[preston powerblast]

Article in last nights Lancashire Evening Post.

Title: BIRD FLU- Should we be worried.

 

Bird flu is by no means new, with the first recorded epidemic occuring in Italy in 1878.

Over the years, the 135 different types of bird flu have caused epidemics in many birds, including poultry, in countries all around the world.

The latest outbreak, which has caused widespread panic across the globe, has been code-named H5N1 and is also known as Avian Influenza.

It has been spreading through Asia since 2003 and so far 112 people are known to have caught the disease, with around half being fatal.

Almost 150 million birds in the region have been slaughtered, but it has failed to stop the virus spreading with recent outbreaks in China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and several reigions of Russia.

There are now concerns that migrating birds could carry the disease from infected areas into the UK.

Precautions have been set up in the UK in an attempt to keep the disease out of the country.

These include a ban on the importation of chickens and meat from infected areas.

Other recommendationd have been given in a joint statement issued by the RSPB, Bird Life international, Wildfowl and wetlands trust and The British Trust For Ornithology.

Which states that wild birds for the pet trade from affected areas should also be banned.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation is a United Nations based food agency.

They have warned that that bird flu is likely to spread to Europe, the Middle East, South asia and Africa and are urging nations at risk to increase surveillance and prepare national emergency plans.

Richard White, a bird entusiast from Lancashire, believes that there is a possibility that migrating birds could bring the disease in, but it is unlikely, he said, its best to be cautious. The wildfowl are the main carriers of bird flu, this includes swans, geese and ducks.

Martin Mere, near Ormskirk welcomes thousands of birds of migrating birds every year, including many that travel from Russia.

Some of those that make the journey include the Berwick's swan, mallard, pintail, widgeon and shoveller, although most birds breeding in affected areas will be migrating to the South and West of the UK.

Mr White explained that many of the migrating birds are not flying into areas of Lancashire where they will have the chance to interract with domestic animals, and therefore could not pass on disease or ifection.

He said. They fly mainly into salt marshes of the Ribble Estuary and the farmland of west Lancashire.

In winter there are up to 100,000 widgeon on the Ribble marshes.

In July the Thialand Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, gave the order for a cull of wild storks over concerns that the birds were spreading avian flu.

Mr White does not agree with this method.

He said it would be practically impossible, not to mention an economic disaster.

Birdlife International is a global alliance of international orginisations and groups.They share the same view and believe that storks are being  needlessly blamed, with the culling being an extremely misguided attempt to control the disease.

Richard Thomas, comminications manager for Birdlife International said. The wild birds are the victims in this outbreak rather than the carriers.

So far all of the cases in wild birds have appeared to have died out quite quickly and the disease hasnt been passed on much further.

It is not entirely clear yet how the disease is spreading, but according to some experts, the cases follow the roads and rail of poultry transport routes.

All cases reported in humans have been in those who have worked very closely with chickens.

It is thought that methods in south east Asia, where domestic flocks are often allowed to mix freely with wild birds, especially waterfowl, have resulted in the disease being passed over to the migrating birds.

In recent months, between five and 10% of the world population of the bar-headed goose died from the virus in China, raising concerns over the economic implications of this outbreak.

The major culls of infected livestock have added to these concerns, bringing back memories of the foot and mouth outbreak in the UK where, contrversially, millions of animals were killed.

A meeting held last week at DEFRA in London was attended by experts from across the UK.

At the meeting Dr Ruth Cromie from the wildfowl and wetlands trust, explained how the migration routes and the threat of bird flu entering the UK were both discussed.

She said there is a possibility that bird flu may enter the UK, but at the meeting we consider the risk to be low...

At Martin Mere there are large flocks of of birds that come in from all over the world every year.

However a lot of these are hooper swans and pink footed geese which are from Iceland.

The huge majority of birds coming into Britiain in the winter are a long way away from those affected areas and i think in Lancashire it should be alright.....

 

Preston Powerblast:

                            I think they need to look at the big picture and consult some proper experts. they are saying that if birds landed in the salt marshes that did carry he virus then it would be ok.

They didnt mention the 450 wildfowlers association members who shoot wildfowl at the opposite side of the estuary all who have labradors and spaniels for retrieving the shot birds.

Then in the next breath they are saying not worry Lancashire will be ok.

This will become another foot and mouth if  it hits this country it will spread rapidly especiall if it happens in the winter.

[Guest]

Good article and reasonable views, Preston Powerblast. I am pleased that we are considering all information and posting it up.

You will see that there is a special "View from the Redding Special on Avian Influenza" in this week's BHW (2nd September) pages 12/13 where much of the emphasis is on HPA1 and migrating birds again, rather than H5N1 and all birds. But at least it is information and the more we have the better, I believe. I emailed our letter on Tuesday evening (30th August) which is beyond their normal deadline, asking for urgent inclusion in this week's edition, but obviously it couldn't be done and hopefully appear next week....a week's delay in getting information on AI out in the public domain is a week we can't afford, I believe.

I think your warning on dogs is appropriate too, in the light of the latest information from Gordon Chalmers and the research paper he provided, mammals are involved too. As I advised earlier, if you are out in the park feeding wild birds, take precautions when you get home. The same should now apply to your dog.

Unexpected benefit from Boot Wash: I now find that I am not carrying anything at all on the soles of my shoes either along the patio slabs or into my kitchen. It is certainly helps cleanliness and hygiene, and I think I'll be adopting it as a normal bit of kit for my back garden loft.

[Guest]

Bruno

 

I am very pleased that Gord Chalmers is stepping up to the plate, this just proves that pigeon flyers can work together internationally for the good of the sport.

 

I'm leaving this evening for 4 days in Colorado, keep up the good work

 

[Guest]

Tried the BHW link to the DEFRA Contingency plan and got a ‘broken link’ error 404 message. Went to EU Contingency plan instead.

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/avian-flu/directive.pdf

 

 

 

Extract : EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON AVIAN INFLUENZA Contingency Plan

 

 

(1) Avian influenza is a serious, highly contagious disease of poultry and other birds caused by different types of influenza viruses. Those viruses may also spread to mammals, including pigs and humans.

(6) Influenza viruses include a large number of different virus strains. The level of risks posed by the different strains of influenza viruses for animal and public health is very variable and to some extent unpredictable, due to rapid virus mutation and possible re-assortment of the genetic material between different strains.

(7) The infection with certain strains of influenza viruses of avian origin may trigger outbreaks in domestic birds of epizootic proportions, causing mortality and disturbances of poultry on a scale, which can threaten in particular the profitability of poultry farming as a whole. Avian influenza viruses may also affect humans and may pose a serious risk to public health.

(8) Current knowledge indicates that the health risks posed by the so-called low pathogenic avian influenza viruses are inferior to the one posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses,which originate from a mutation of certain low pathogenic viruses.

(9) Community legislation for the control of avian influenza should give the possibility for the Member States to adopt disease control measures in a proportionate and flexible manner,taking into account the various levels of risk posed by different virus strains, the likely social and economic impact of the measures in question on the agriculture sector and other sectors involved while at the same time ensuring that the measures taken for each specific disease scenario are the most appropriate.

(10) With a view to preventing and anticipating the public health problems which may be posed by avian influenza, effective communication and close co-operation should be sought between the animal and public health services in the Member States, so that appropriate measures to safeguard human health can also be taken by the competent authorities, whenever necessary.

(11) In view of the potential of low pathogenic avian influenza viruses to mutate into highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, provision should be made for the early detection of infection in poultry aimed at a quick reaction and the adoption of appropriate measures which should include a system of active surveillance to be carried out by Member States. That surveillance should follow general guidelines which should be adapted in the light of further knowledge and developments in this field.

 

 

One of the misunderstandings I (and the Press, judging by their reports on Avian Flu) have picked up is that HPAI was a specific strain of the virus. It isn’t. It is an acronym meaning HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA.  I find that particularly confusing when it and H5N1 - a virus strain - are mentioned in the same sentence. Please be warned and be aware of this. LPAI is LOW PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA, which can mutate to become HPAI.

 

 

 

 

[jimmy white]

reading the information sent to me , i am, more  than satisfied that VIRKON S  is the best disinfectant of them all, this disinfectant has such multiple uses as a        broad spectrum disinfectant , that it beats them all [ive looked at them all, or all i could find]   one thing that did surprise me though,    was that ALL DISINFECTIVES, are inactive below 4 degrees cent.but to read sex pages on this product has certainly got me convinced, and the uses are allmost end less, so im away now to put some in my tea , if you dont here from me again, youll know i was wrong ha ha. p.s   may i add at[ the propper dilution]  I HOPE P.B. IS NOT JUST AFTER MY WILL.

           

           VIRKON S       BRILLIANT

                                             JIMMY  

[preston powerblast]

Virkon S is the Daddy.

Its one of the best broad spectrum disinfectants.

Who's will. ;D

[preston powerblast]

Article in this weeks Farmers Guardian:

 

The risk of avian influenza or bird flu reching the Uk is likely to increase over time, the president of the British Veterinary Association has warned.

 

While the government said this week the risk was remote to low, Dr Bob McCracken said it was inevitable it would appear in the Uk at some point.

While the risk of the introduction of the virus in the UK is considered to be low, we must recognise that risk is more likely to increase with time rather than decrease, he said.

The virus has already spread form South East Asia to Russia and is likely to be present in several wild bird populations within these countries.

In the course of time these infected birds will probably pass this infection on to additional populations of wild birds. Eventually, birds whose migratory pathway includes Europe and the UK  will become infected and wil have the potential to introduce the virus to domesticated birds in Europe.

Dr McCracken said it was essential that preventative measures remained in place while an active virus was present in the world.

We need to find the first introduction and not the 51st one, six months later, he said.

Despite his warning, the government confirmed it would not be following the Dutch Goverments ban on keeping free-range poultry outdoors.

The Experts concluded that it would not be proportionate fort he current risk of disease to introduce a general ban on keeping poultry outdoors.

Said the chief veterinary officer, Debbie Reynolds, who represented the UK at the European Commission emergency meeting on the avian flu outbreak.

At the moment we are not aware of any evidence that birds can transport this disease.

We believe the risk of the virus spreading into the European Union via migrating birds is remote or low, she said.

The outbreak in Russia has killed around 11,000 birds and led to the slaughter of 127,000 others as officials attempt to halt the spread of the virus.

NFU chief poultry advisor Peter King said it was not surprising that the Dutch had taken such a radical step in response to the presence of thye disease in Russia.

They experienced an outbrak of bird flu only two years ago when upwards of 20 million chickens had to be slaughtered. However, it is imprtant to remember that even then the disease did not spread to the UK, said Mr King.

Following the emergency meeting last week, the EU has asked member states to step up sampling of migrating wildfowl along migrating routes.

It has also asked customs and border control police agencies to enforce an import ban on poutry meat and feathers from infected areas of Asia.

Contigency plans in the event of an outbreak of avian influenza disease in the UK wee laid before parliament in July.

Once an outbreak has been notified, officials will have the power to order a preventative cull.

In the slaughter protocol published by DEFRA, it specifies that "a major factor will be to get ahead of the disease.

The slaughter would include those flocks which should they become infected would present a significant risk to the farming and poultry community more generally by contributing to the spread of disease.

Shadow Agriculture Minister Owen Patterson said the government still need to state the circumstances under which the British flock would be compulsorily housed outdoors.

We also need to know waht measures are being undertaken by the Government to monitor the arrival of migratory birds at sites in the UK and the infectivity of these birds, he said.

[Guest]

I FINALLY GOT TO THE DEFRA CONTINGENCY PLAN AND I AM VERY SORRY THAT I DID. I CAN HARDLY TYPE FOR SHAKING AND I DON'T MIND ADMITTING MY FACE IS SOAKED WITH TEARS: I WILL TRY  AND TYPE UP ONE SECTION AT A TIME, BUT THIS ONE'S ALL YOU'LL NEED FOR NOW:

 

SECTION 1 - Background - Avian Influenza (Highly Pathogenic)

1.1 AI is a highly infectious viral disease that can affect all species of birds. The severity of disease depends upon the strain and subtype of virus and the type of bird infected.

1.2 Highly pathogenic AI (HPAI) viruses have the potential to cause severe disease in poultry, associated with a high death rate (up to 100%); the course of such disease can be so rapid the birds may die without showing signs of disease.

1.3 Infection with low pathogenic AI (LPAI) viruses usually results in milder, less significant disease. However, some LPAI viruses can mutate into highly pathogenic strains.

1.4 Waterfowl can be infected with either HPAI or LPAI viruses without showing any signs of disease. Apparently healthy ducks have been shown to excrete HPAI virus for extended periods of time. They are thus an important reservoir, acting as a potential source of infection to poultry and other animals.

1.5 EU legislation to control and eradicate AI applies to HPAI. Flocks found to be infected with LPAI would be assessed. It is likely that such flocks would be slaughtered.

1.6 Controls would apply to domestic fowls, turkeys, geese, ducks, guinea fowls, quails, pigeons, ratites (e.g. ostriches), pheasants and partridges reared or kept in captivity for breeding, the production of meat or eggs for consumption or eggs for restocking supplies of game.

1.7 AI could be introduced to domestic poultry through contact with infective migrating wild birds, particularly waterfowl. Contact could be direct or indirect through contamination of feed, water or objects, particularly with faeces.

AI virus could also be introduced on contaminated clothing or objects and there is also a risk of introduction from the illegal import of live birds.

1.8 Good biosecurity is required to stop onward spread.

 

Public Health Implications Avian Influenza (Highly Pathogenic)

1.9 Transmission of avian influenza viruses to people remains relatively rare and in most cases occurs as a result of direct contact with infected poultry or other birds or their faeces. Faecal material can contaminate dust, soil, water, feed, equipment and clothing and feathers. Transmission to people only occurs with certain strains of avian influenza. Information about the current outbreaks of avian flu is available on the World Health Organisation website at:

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/chronology/en

AI 4

1.10 Symptoms of avian flu in people range from mild conjunctivitis to typical flulike illness which can lead to acute respiratory illness, viral pneumonia and can be fatal. Infection with avian influenza virus A/H5N1 has been characterised by sudden onset with cough and fever and high fever. There is currently no vaccine for the treatment of avian flu in people, though one is being developed. There is evidence that avian flu viruses respond to antiviral drugs and in the UK oseltamivir ('Tamiflu') or other appropriate antiviral agent would be used for the treatment and prevention of avian flu in people.

1.11 Avian influenza has two significant implications for human health:

♦ the severity of illness that may follow infection with avian flu virus

♦ the potential for adaptation of avian influenza virus A/H5N1 into a strain, that both causes severe disease in humans and spreads easily from person to person, or its transformation, through exchange of genes with a human flu virus, into a completely novel virus capable of spreading easily between people and causing severe illness on a pandemic scale.

1.12 Experts fear that the continued spread of A/H5N1 increases the opportunity for people to become infected concurrently with human and avian flu viruses. If this happens, the person could act as a 'mixing vessel', enabling genetic re-assortment of the virus to occur and a novel influenza virus strain to emerge.

1.13 For further information: The Chief Medical Officer has published a guide:

'Explaining Pandemic Flu’ and a Contingency Plan for Pandemic Flu and these are available on the Department of Health website: http://www.dh.gov.uk/

 

1.14 Public health control measures in any outbreak of avian influenza amongst poultry will therefore aim to protect people against avian influenza and also protect against the risk of genetic reassortment of the virus. The Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation has advised that routine vaccination of poultry workers and veterinarians with seasonal human flu vaccine is not recommended, but should be used in a confirmed outbreak of avian flu as a protection against the possibility of re-assortment with human flu virus.

1.15 Antiviral therapy, as appropriate, to protect against the development of avian flu will be given to those who may be exposed to the infection through close contact with infected birds.

 

GET THE F*ING BIRDS LOCKED UP NOW!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[Guest]

DEFRA CONTINGENCY PLAN - AI - Continued - SECTION 2

 

SECTION 2 - Legislation

2.1 Much of the disease control strategy is based on European legislation implemented in our domestic laws. This is supported by administrative provisions. This Annex describes these.

Animal Health Act 1981

2.2 The Animal Health Act 1981 provides powers for the control of outbreaks of AI and ND. It was amended in 2002 to provide more powers to deal with foot and mouth disease and these powers were extended by the Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease (England & Wales) Order in 2003 so that they are now exercisable in relation to AI and ND. The Act, as amended, provides for • slaughter of diseased poultry, poultry suspected of disease, poultry exposed to disease and poultry which the Secretary of State thinks should be slaughtered to prevent the spread of disease.

• payment of compensation for birds that are slaughtered but are not diseased.

• publication of a slaughter protocol prior to exercising the power to impose a preventive or firebreak cull. Emergency vaccination would have to be considered prior to any cull, and, if not used, the reasons would have to be published.

• veterinary inspectors to have powers to enter premises to ascertain whether disease anti-bodies exist, whether any animal is or was infected with disease and whether any causative agent of disease is present

• publication of biosecurity guidance

• preparation and review of a national contingency plan

The Diseases of Poultry (England) Order 2003

2.3 The Diseases of Poultry (England) Order 2003, made under the Animal Health Act 1981, implements Council Directive 92/40/EEC for the control of AI and Council Directive 92/66/EEC for the control of ND. Its provisions include the following:

• Notification of suspicion of AI or ND in captive birds and in any premises.• Imposition of movement controls on suspicion of disease.• Entry to premises for the purposes of veterinary inquiry.• Where disease is confirmed, the imposition of a Protection Zone (minimum 3km) and a Surveillance Zone (minimum 10km) around the infected premises by declaratory order.

• Elimination of the disease by slaughter of infected and contact animals.• C & D of buildings used to house poultry, their surroundings, the vehicles used for transport and all equipment likely to be contaminated;

AI 6

• Powers to require, by publication of a notice, the vaccination of any species of poultry in any given area and for any given period.

2.4 The Diseases of Poultry Order also extends provisions for investigating premises and imposing movement restrictions to all diseases of birds and all species of birds.

2.5 The table below indicates the local veterinary action to be taken in relation

to the level of suspicion.

SUMMARY OF INITIAL ACTION ON SUSPECT CASES LEVEL OF SUSPICION

IMMEDIATE ACTION

Level 0 – disease not suspected following veterinary inquiry.

All restrictions on premises lifted no further action.

Level 1 – lesions and clinical disease not typical – but disease cannot be ruled out entirely on

clinical grounds.

Suspect flock left alive and observed.

Samples submitted for laboratory

diagnosis. Premises restrictions imposed.

Level 2 - lesions and clinical

disease suggestive of a notifiable poultry disease but not entirely convincing.

Suspect flock left alive and observed.

Samples submitted for laboratory diagnosis.

Premises restrictions imposed.

Level 3 - veterinary staff at premises under investigation and at HQ believe from examination on clinical grounds that disease exists.

All poultry on the premises slaughtered on suspicion.

Samples submitted for laboratory diagnosis.

Premises restrictions imposed.

Area restrictions imposed.

Contact Public Health Partners.

Level 4 - as at level 3 plus disease already confirmed in the country or substantial evidence that disease may have entered the country for example disease in imported animals originating from a region with confirmed notifiable poultry disease.

Disease confirmed on clinical grounds only without awaiting laboratory results.

Samples submitted for laboratory diagnosis.

Premises restrictions imposed.

Area restrictions imposed.

All susceptible poultry on the premises slaughtered.

Dangerous contacts traced and slaughtered depending on veterinary assessment.Contact and liaison with public health partners.

 

 

[Guest]

DEFRA CONTINGENCY PLAN - AI - CONTD  SECTION 3

 

SECTION 3 - Disease Control Strategy

3.1 The disease control strategy adopted will be consistent with the UK’s EU obligations and in line with the appropriate EU legislation. The Government’s objective in tackling AI will be to eradicate the disease and to restore the UK’s disease-free status as quickly as possible. In doing so, Government will seek to select control strategies which:

• minimise the number of poultry which need to be slaughtered, either to control the disease or on welfare grounds, and which keeps poultry welfare problems to a minimum;

• cause the least possible disruption to the food, farming and tourism industries, to visitors to the countryside, and to rural communities and the wider economy;

• minimise damage to the environment and protecting public health; and

• minimise the burden on taxpayers and the public at large.

Premises Controls

3.2 The following measures will be applied on confirmation of AI:

(Note: The first case will be confirmed by the CVO following laboratory diagnosis)

3.3 Premises where disease has been confirmed are known as infected premises (IPs); birds that have been exposed to infection through contact with the infected premises are known as dangerous contacts (DCs).• All poultry on IPs will be culled. Dangerous contacts will be identified. Where the risk of exposure to virus is high, the poultry will be culled and laboratory samples taken. Where the risk of exposure is assessed as not high, restrictions on the premises will be in place for 21 days and regular veterinary visits undertaken.

• Movement restrictions will apply to the IP or high risk DC until all birds have been culled, cleaning and disinfection has been completed and a veterinary inspector is satisfied that disease no longer exists on the premises• Restriction are applied and lifted by serving the occupier of the premises with notices, which explain the restrictions imposed and any licensing provisions.

Area Controls

3.4 The Diseases of Poultry (England) Order 2003 (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/) gives inspectors powers on suspicion of disease to impose movement controls on the suspected premises. However, once disease has been confirmed, area controls and restrictions are imposed by a Declaratory Order.

3.5 A Diseases of Poultry Declaratory Order can be made in respect of the area surrounding an Infected Premises. A Declaratory Order provides for the division of the Infected Area into protection and surveillance zones, the protection zone being a minimum radius of three kilometres from the IP and contained in a surveillance zone based on a minimum radius of ten kilometres from the IP. The Declaratory Order applies the provisions of Schedule 2 of the Diseases of Poultry Order to the infected area unless they are varied or excepted by the Declaratory Order.

3.6 The requirements of Schedule 2 are:

Protection Zones

• For at least 21 days after the preliminary C & D of the IP required by paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the 2003 Order and thereafter until the Secretary of State declares the protection zone to have become part of the surveillance zone, the occupier of premises containing poultry shall ensure that –

any inspector who requires information as to the presence of poultry on those premises is supplied with such information as soon as practicable;

any veterinary inspector who visits the premises to examine the poultry and take samples is given all necessary assistance and information;

the poultry are kept in their living quarters or such other place where they can be isolated;

there is an appropriate means of disinfection at the entrance and exits of the premises;

poultry and hatching eggs are not moved from the premises except under a licence issued by a veterinary inspector:

• for the purpose of transport for immediate slaughter to a designated slaughterhouse, or

• in the case of day old chicks or ready-to-lay pullets, to premises within the surveillance zone on which there are no other poultry, or • in the case of hatching eggs to a designated hatchery, subject to the eggs and their packing being disinfected before dispatch; and used litter and poultry manure are not removed or spread.

• The Order provides that no person shall –

move any poultry, eggs or carcases within the zone, except that poultry may be transported without stopping through the zone on a major highway or railway.

hold any fair, market, show or other gathering of poultry or other birds.

Surveillance zones

• The following restrictions apply within the surveillance zone and will continue to apply for a period of at least 30 days after the preliminary cleansing and disinfection of the infected premises required by paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the 2003 Order and thereafter until the Secretary of State declares the restrictions to be lifted.

• The occupier of premises must ensure that –

any inspector who requires information as to presence of poultry on those premises is supplied with such information as soon as practicable;

poultry are not moved from the premises out of the zone except under a licence issued by a veterinary inspector for the purpose of transport direct to a designated slaughterhouse outside the surveillance zone;

hatching eggs are not moved from the premises out of the zone except under a licence issued by a veterinary inspector for the purpose of transport direct to a designated hatchery and subject to the eggs and their packing being disinfected before dispatch; and

used litter and poultry manure are not moved out of the zone.

• The Order provides that no person shall –

move any poultry or hatching eggs into or within the zone except that poultry may be transported without stopping through the zone on a major highway or railway.

hold any fair, market, show or other gathering of poultry or other birds.

• The owner of any vehicle used to convey poultry, poultry carcases, poultry offal, poultry feathers or eggs originating in an infected area, before it is so used, as soon as practicable after each time it is so used and in any event before it is so used again, must effectively clean and disinfect it.

3.7 If AI were ever confirmed in any species of captive birds (other than in commercial species), or in RACING PIGEONS, then slaughter, premises and area movement controls could be put into place if a veterinary risk assessment concluded that there was a risk of disease spreading to commercial poultry.

Future developments

3.8 A new Diseases of Poultry (England) Order is being considered to revoke and remake the 2003 Order. It is likely that it will provide for the possibility of:

• a Temporary Control Zone (TCZ) with local area movement restrictions on suspicion of disease on a premises.

• a Controlled Area with movement restrictions covering part, or all of, England around an Infected Area.

• Closure of footpaths in the Protection Zone

3.9 A Controlled Area would be implemented by means of a Declaratory Order.

3.10 Additional strategies could include:

• Increasing the size of the Infected Area

• A cull of flocks in the immediate area (1km, 3km or possibly larger if necessary to prevent the spread of disease)

3.11 There is a Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol for use in the event of a preemptive (or firebreak) cull at Part III: AI Annex A.

3.12 This protocol sets out the requirements that must be followed if a preemptive cull is to be undertaken.

Low Pathogenic AI Controls

3.13 Any flocks in which LPAI is confirmed would be individually assessed.

However, the controls are likely to be:

• Slaughter of flocks exposed to the disease with compensation paid;

• Surveillance of poultry holdings surrounding the infected premises;

• Risk based restriction on holdings or premises until cleared of the presence of disease.

Vaccination

3.14 There is provision in the Diseases of Poultry (England) Order 2003 for the imposition of a compulsory vaccination zone. However, in view of the limitations, summarised below, vaccination is not expected to be part of the current GB avian influenza control strategy.

• The vaccines that are currently available to protect against AI disease are inactivated types and need to be delivered by injecting birds individually. It can take up to three weeks for birds to develop protective immunity and some poultry require two doses. The difficulties in delivering such a vaccine to a large number of birds are huge and render this approach impractical on a large scale.

• These vaccines protect against disease but will not protect birds from becoming infected and shedding virus. Although vaccination will reduce the amount of virus shed by birds this reduced amount may be still be significant and could cause infection in other birds

• No AI vaccines have marketing authorisation in Great Britain.

3.15 However, there may be a role for vaccination in the protection of zoological collections of rare breeds or endangered species. Such use would be subject to a Commission Decision adopted by the Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health in Brussels.

 

Additional controls

• Export health certificates for live poultry and hatching eggs will be withdrawn. Consignments of live birds, day old chicks and if possible poultry meat exported during the risk period would be identified and authorities in the importing country notified.

• Disposal of carcases and other poultry products (e.g. eggs) by incineration would be implemented immediately

Further Action

3.16 Once AI is confirmed, the main elements of this plan are brought into action.

In particular:

Part I: Generic Plan, Section 3 outlines emergency preparedness & mobilisation

Part I: Generic Plan, Section 4 describes outbreak management

Part I: Generic Plan, Section 5 sets out the main elements of the Communications Plan;

Part I: Generic Plan, Section 6 describes the strategic, tactical and operational organisations and structures.

These last two sections are augmented by the SVS instructions and the local office contingency plans.

 

 

[Guest]

DEFRA CONTINGENCY PLAN - A1 - CONTD - SECTION 4

 

SECTION 4 - Outbreak Management – AI

Health and Safety and Staff Welfare

4.1 Everyone in contact with diseased birds must follow the precautions detailed in the relevant risk assessment. Because of the possible different strains and varying infectivity of each strain of avian influenza virus to people, a precautionary approach should be taken. Anyone with medical conditions that may increase the risk of infection with avian influenza, such as respiratory disease or a reduced immuno-competence will be advised to stay away from poultry farms, avoid all contact with infected birds and seek appropriate medical advice.

4.2 All who have had, or are likely to have contact with infected birds will need to be provided with information as to how to protect themselves and their families from infection.

4.3 To protect against infection, a hierarchy of control measures are needed which include:

♦ safe working practice in accordance with the risk assessment

♦ the wearing of all appropriate personal protective equipment by poultry workers/handlers/cullers/veterinarians;

♦ safe disposal of used personal protective clothing and equipment

♦ use of the antiviral oseltamivir (‘Tamiflu’) or other appropriate antiviral agent for the prescribed period by all who are considered to be at risk of infection and for whom antiviral therapy is not contraindicated

♦ vaccination with seasonal flu vaccine of all those considered to be at risk of infection and for whom vaccine is not contraindicated

♦ monitoring of health status of persons exposed to infected birds

♦ guidance to those at risk of infection on the personal hygiene measures to be taken to protect their health and to prevent the spread of infection.

4.4 The Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation has advised that in the event of an outbreak of HPAI in poultry, those exposed to infection should be offered seasonal flu vaccine as a precaution against the possibility of coinfection with human flu. Vaccine should be given as soon as possible, either before or at time of exposure, and at least within 48 hours of initial exposure.

4.5 Antiviral therapy should be given as soon as possible, either before or at the time of exposure, and at least within 48 hours of initial exposure.

4.6 Information and guidance for anyone working with poultry that may be affected with avian influenza, may be found at:

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/disease/HSforal.pdf

 

4.7 Persons not employed by Defra should also seek health and safety guidance from their employer's Health and Safety adviser or medical practitioner. Advice is also available from the Health and Safety Executive on their website:

http://www.hse.gov.uk

Notification of disease

4.8 Where a suspect or confirmed case of avian influenza in birds is notified to the DVM, the DVM shall notify:

♦ the Health Protection Agency's duty officer at the Centre for Emergency Response, Porton Down on 01980 612100 (24 hour telephone response).

♦ the local Director of Public Health within the Primary Care Trust.

4.9 Upon receipt of a notification of suspected or confirmed avian influenza in birds, the role of the Health Protection Agency is to support Defra and the State Veterinary Service in the investigation and control of the incident in relation to the protection of human health. This support will include the surveillance of influenza diseases in the populations at risk associated with the outbreak, provision of advice and guidance on public health control measures, medical interventions and health advice to the public.Specifically the HPA will:

♦ Notify the local Health Protection Unit in the area within which the disease is occurring

♦ Notify the Department of Health

♦ Liaise with the local Director of Public Health in the area where the disease is occurring as to the steps needed for the protection of human health and communication with the public

♦ Locally, through the Health Protection Unit and in consultation with the local Director of Public Health and NHS colleagues and Defra's occupational health services, coordinate the investigation of human health implications of confirmed disease in birds and the provision of all necessary medical interventions, such as the administration of antiviral drugs and 'flu vaccine, to those at risk of avian influenza infection including to those at risk of infection as a

result of occupational exposure.

♦ Locally through the Health Protection Unit and in consultation with the local Director of Public Health and DVM, ensure that a joint Incident Control Team is convened as appropriate

 

BIOSECURITY GUIDANCE

4.10 Anyone coming into contact with poultry or their manure/litter runs the risk of spreading animal diseases. Biosecurity is the prevention of disease causing agents entering or leaving a livestock premises. It involves a number of measures and protocols designed to prevent potential disease causing agents being spread from one premises to another.

4.11 Guidance has been produced for all those who go onto farms. It applies to everyone who enters a farm or premises with farm animals or enters land used for grazing or keeping farm animals. It applies to all animal diseases covered and includes poultry. It deals with the precautions to be taken when entering or leaving any premises with farm animals in the absence of an outbreak of animal disease, after confirmation of an outbreak of an animal disease, and to premises under specific animal disease restrictions. All personnel implementing this contingency plan in the field must follow this guidance. It is at:

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/pdf/biosecurity_guidance.pdf

 

4.12 Poultry owners, (particularly those with backyard flocks), game and wild bird keepers should keep wild birds, dogs, cats, rodents and other livestock out of poultry buildings and feed stores. Owners are encouraged to have an active rodent and pest control system in place, and should be vigilant for evidence of vermin and monitor vermin activity by baiting and trapping.

4.13 Further advice for poultry keepers is at Part III: AI, Annex B and may be found on the Defra website at:

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/pdf/poultrybiosec.pdf

 

4.14 This advice, and the health and safety guidance set out in this Plan is kept under review. It will be reissued and brought to all poultry keepers’ attention in the event of an outbreak of AI. Defra ADC Division will provide access to use existing poultry sector databases to mail the guidance and Press Releases. Any networks that have been developed by Defra EDPC division with respect to Farm Health Planning Initiatives (under the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy) will be used as an additional communication channel with industry, veterinary bodies and other bodies to alert poultry keepers to available best practice advice.

ANIMAL WELFARE

General Welfare Responsibilities

4.15 There is a responsibility on all involved with the keeping of poultry to anticipate problems and to take steps to mitigate the effects. Guidance would be issued by Defra to poultry keepers in advance of, or in the early stages, of movement restrictions being put in place. If welfare problems arise which cannot be alleviated by management or husbandry practices, poultry keepers will be given the opportunity to move their birds under licence. Such movements will include movement to slaughter for the food chain or to more suitable land or buildings for e.g., broilers and spent hens in infected areas will be permitted to move to slaughter and as such a welfare disposal scheme would not be required for these birds.

4.16 The following poultry enterprises maybe at greatest risk of welfare problems

if disease control measures are introduced:

 

Welfare - Point of lay birds

4.17 Point of lay birds will need to be moved from rearer to laying accommodation. If laying accommodation can be found within the same movement restriction zone then welfare issues will not arise. However if there is no laying accommodation available within the zone these birds will present a welfare issue.

Welfare – Broilers

4.18 Broilers, hens and other poultry in Protection and Surveillance zones and under restrictions may also need to enter a welfare disposal scheme if they cannot move to slaughter houses.

Welfare - Hatcheries

4.19 Hatcheries produce day old chicks, which are then delivered to rearing units.

Current legislation allows the hatcheries to deliver day old chicks to rearing units only if they are located in the same infected area. However it is not felt that a welfare disposal scheme would be required for this category of bird because hatcheries on the whole will be aware that there is no capacity on rearing farms and can destroy the chicks and embryos humanely.

4.20 In order to reduce the risk of exposure it may be necessary to house poultry. Free-range producers should ensure that adequate contingency arrangements are in place for providing for the welfare of free-range birds when they need to be kept housed.

4.21 In these circumstances a welfare disposal scheme could be introduced, following a declaration by a veterinary surgeon that the birds in question are suffering (or will suffer in next four weeks) welfare problems, which are directly attributable to the movement restrictions. Defra will arrange the killing and disposal of birds. The killing will take place on farms, not in slaughterhouses.

4.22 There would be no compensation for birds slaughtered under a disposal scheme. This is in line with current Government policy.

4.23 The Head of Livestock Strategy Control Division, in consultation with the Heads of Animal Welfare Policy Division, Animal Welfare Veterinary Division and Exotic Disease Prevention and Control Division will draw up a contingency plan for such measures and will consult stakeholders on it.

 

 

Slaughter

4.28 In the event of AI being identified the slaughter of poultry would be considered as a control measure in order to eliminate disease. The department will deploy a range of slaughter techniques including necking, gassing and electrocution, depending on the numbers, species and location of the birds. Contingency contracts are in place with poultry catchers and killers. See Part III:

AI, Section 4 and Annex A for details on Disease Control Strategy and Disease

Control (Slaughter) Protocol.

 

 

 

 

WELL THERE YOU HAVE THE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR AVIAN INFLUENZA. Not much of a surprise was it? The full Plan runs to over 300 pages and is available at:

 

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/disease/newcastle/pdf/genericcp-final.pdf

 

[preston powerblast]

Wow, I thought i was clued up. but this lot has just shown me how out of touch i really am.

Well done Bruno its made a very interesting read and by judging this lets keep our fingers crossed that it doesnt hit us bad.

Cause by the way this lot reads we will  all be F******

[jimmy white]

i was joking in a previos post  about the virkon s in tea and if you dont hear from me,    im a gonner etc [ by the way i did do that and im still here]  and have no hesitation about the virtues on this product, it is exellent , BUT,,,,,,, i will now say you wont here a lot from me as im studying every post and trying my best to digest all this,IN DETAIL, especialy the recent posts by bruno, this is absolutely amazing, and certainly worth more than just a quick look, THIS IS HOT STUFF, AND FOR WHAT ITS WORTH  FROM ME    ,ALL BIRD KEEPERS , SHOULD DO THE SAME .   READ AND DIGEST,,,,

   BRUNO,    HAS AND IS STILL DOING A MOST MARVELOUS JOB.

                                                                                        THANKS BRUNO.

[jimmy white]

   P.S   I WISH TO THANK -ALL- WHO HAVE, AND STILL ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THIS VERY WORRYING TOPIC.  JIMMY

[THE FIFER]

well done to u all the info is first class and great work and time being put into it, keep up the good work. the fifer.

[Guest]

While I agree that we should continue to collect as much information as possible on Avian Flu, that must surely also require follow-up action.

One of the vital pieces of information is still missing - nobody REALLY knows (yet) how this virus spreads. It broke out of Hong King (read the Hong piece posted earlier) when they thought they had it contained. It spread to countries throughout South East Asia and despite efforts to contain the disease there, in 2005 it has broken out again, into Russia which some consider to be Asia because it happens to be the 'wrong' side of the Urals to be called Europe.

In addition the virus itself is very difficult to predict.

All this adds up in my mind to "shut and bar the door (and lock it too) before it arrives here in the UK".

I am now trying to convince people to take action now.

I hope you heed my advice and try to get others to follow. I have correspondance away to the SHU last week, and in the light of the BHW "View from the Reddings Special Report on Avian Influenza, I emailed the GM last night. I hope you will all follow suit with your home Organisations too - again I don't want this to be seen as a Bruno one person (nutter?) campaign.  And just to remind you - we DO have Gordon Chalmers and Kevin Ball on our side, and the SHU at least has been informed of this.

 

3/9/05

 

Dear Mr Bryant

 

I was interested in your “View from the Reddings Special Avian Influenza” published in the BHW on 2nd September 05.

While it undoubtedly presents us with more information on Avian Influenza I feel the fact that it is a DEFRA-derived document, and not RPRA ADVICE, could be missed by your readers with dire consequences for us all.

“Current assessment and Response” is especially misleading, both in title (DEFRA’s assessment, not RPRA’s) and content. For example Q19/A19. ‘Key industry stakeholders agree with the Government’s current assessment’ isn’t borne out by Organic Farmers & Growers with free-range chickens, who would follow the Dutch lead and bring their flocks inside tomorrow, if DEFRA would guarantee that ‘free range status’ would continue:-.

 

"Call for clarity on avian flu risks 26 August, 2005

 

Defra must be swift in providing a clear lead on measures which may be necessary to avoid an avian flu outbreak, says a leading organic certifier. Organic Farmers & Growers (OF&G) is deeply concerned that timely advice and early planning is crucial as Britain and Northern Ireland's poultry industry braces itself for the possibility of extreme measures. Many producers and processors are nervous about whether rulings such as moving birds indoors will be introduced and, if so, what can be done to limit the impact of this. OF&G inspects and certifies the vast majority of organic eggs and poultry in the UK. It's Business Manager, Richard Jacobs, said: "The uncertainty, while terrible for the whole industry, is undoubtedly worse for organic and free-range producers. Not only would they face the same problems as their non-organic counterparts, as things stand today their hard-earned organic or free-range status would be in doubt. "People are having visions of their entire livelihoods disappearing and it's only fair to give them some reassurance. We also need to know that the most rigorous surveillance programme is in place as an early warning system."

Full report: http://www.organicfarmers.org.uk/news/news_more.php?id=82

 

One of the critical pieces of information which we don’t have (nobody has) is how this virus is spreading from country to country. If you read the summary work on the original outbreak in Hong Kong in 2002 (email attachment) you will detect over-optimism in control of the spread of the disease.. which broke out and spread throughout SE Asia. You will also be alarmed at the range of birds involved, with a feral pigeon ‘fingered’ from the very beginning. None of these birds could be considered migratory.

We are still awaiting results from the dead gull in Finland (two weeks to wait – can you believe a delay like that in an epidemic / pandemic scenario?). Gulls can’t be considered migratory.

There was also an Avian Influenza outbreak last year in Canada. Like you, I hadn’t heard of that either.

So while everyone’s binoculars are trained on migrant birds from the East, we may have another wave of migrants due from the West that nobody is looking out for, nor all the other ‘suspects’ - birds like gulls that inhabit every UK Port town and inland landfill site ……….

I was especially interested in Q21/A21 DEFRA’s Contingency Plan. I assume you haven’t read it as it runs to over 300 pages. I have extracted the sections specifically relevant to Avian Influenza (email attachment) .

I think after you read just these sections you will be shocked at what could be just round the corner for us and our birds – unless we take reasonable and sensible precautions now while the UK is still virus-free.

My wish for reasonable and sensible precautions has already been published in the letter’s page on 19th August and a joint call with Gordon Chalmers for that will be published (I hope) in this week’s edition (9th September). This call was made BEFORE we had access to DEFRA’s contingency plan.

Now reasonable and sensible precaution simply entails following the Dutch Poultry lead and confining our birds to their lofts. Taking minimum biosecurity precautions (disinfectant boot wash outside the loft door and good personal hygiene). We are after all locking up healthy birds and taking precautions to ensure they remain that way, so safeguarding our own health and that of others. And it must done be to a loft –up and down the UK. Because birds flying free from one loft and discovered to house a bird harbouring the virus endangers all other lofts within 3km of it.

I suggest you read the email attachments and make the call sooner than later.

 

 

 

[jimmy white]

bruno  i certainly hope no one ever even begins to thing ,,,,nutter,,,,, im quite sure we all see the work time etc your putting into this, ijust hope the fanciers realise this, which im sure most of them do,  AS YOU ARE DOING IT FOR THEM and may i add for no financial gain,  which makes a change ,in this world we are living in today.

as i said before, every shred of information is vital, from any one, providing it is not rumour and scare mongering, which im afraid to say,   is sometimes the case among bird fanciers, as this subject is scary enough  , as i said before , read and digest, and if you have any informative news      post it.

[Guest]

Reply from Peter Bryant, GM RPRA received this morning:

 

Thank you for your comprehensive e mail.

Please let me assure you that there was no intention to offer the VFTR special as 'RPRA Advice'. I don't have the authority as yet to offer that.

I sincerely felt that, following the advice from DEFRA, the fancy should be advised of the possible implication of this awful disease.

Of course we have sort of been this way before with the FMD epidemic and we were told the RPRA overreacted to a race ban when the WHPU and NEHU decided to race!

The implications for all avian holders in the UK let alone pigeon fanciers if AI hits is dire: that is why I wanted the fancy to be under no illusion of what to expect should this disease affect our shores. To some extent it will help that we are an island but if the migratory birds are the carriers then this will have no bearing on the spread.

regards Peter Bryant

General Manager

The Royal Pigeon Racing Association

The Reddings near Cheltenham,

Glos GL51 6RN

tel 01452 713529 fax 857119